Moral Perception and the Function of the *Vis Cogitativa* in Thomas Aquinas’s Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions*

[The] world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like.

Husserl, *Ideas*, I, §27

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between passions that are *antecedent* to the judgment of reason and passions that are *consequent* to the judgment of reason. The recent interest in Thomas’s moral psychology, and in particular his treatment of the passions, their obedience to practical reason, and the part they play in virtuous, continent, incontinent, and vicious human action, has occasioned a few scholarly studies attendant to his distinction between antecedent and consequent passions.

*I would like to thank Steven Jensen for his helpful comments on a prior draft of this paper.  
3 For articles that address antecedent and consequent passions along with other related matters, see: M. Stock, *Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas*, « The Thomist », 21/4, 1958, pp. 415-
Some of these studies have also taken notice of Thomas’s detailed division of the complex interplay among the concert operations of the senses, passions, reason, and will. Nonetheless, few scholars have highlighted the function of the highest internal sense power, the cogitative power (vis cogitativa), within the dynamic complex of operations and powers that Thomas ascribes to the human person. And so far as I know, no recent study takes the function of the vis cogitativa in Aquinas’s moral psychology as its primary focus. In this paper I aim to fill part of that lacuna by explicating the function of the vis cogitativa as a power of moral perception. I shall show that getting clear on how the cogitative power contributes to moral perception also illumines Thomas’s distinction between antecedent and consequent passions, and accordingly, a host of other connected issues in Aquinas, such as the obedience of the passions to reason, continence and incontinence, and the unity of the virtues through prudence. Needless to say, I shall not venture into the details of each of these intricate topics.

The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I shall summarize the salient points of a few recent studies on Thomas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. This synopsis will provide the philosophical and exegetical point of departure of the second part by setting in relief a lacuna in these recent interpretations of Thomas’s treatment of the contribution of virtuous passions to practical reason. The second part will aim to complement these studies by filling that lacuna through a detailed exposition of Thomas’s account of the salient functions ascribed to the cogitative power with respect to the operations.
of practical reason and the obedience of the passions to reason. Let us begin with a few recent interpretations of Thomas’s doctrine of virtuous passions.

I. Virtuous Passions and Practical Reason in Aquinas

Thomas locates each one of the four cardinal virtues in different powers from his philosophical anthropology; the principal subject of prudence is practical reason, justice perfects the will, temperance orders the concupiscible appetite, and fortitude enhances the irascible appetite. The three moral virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude are all united by prudence. The unity of the virtues through prudence is rooted in the way each of the appetitive powers — the subjects of the moral virtues — are related to practical reason. Practical reason specifies the objects of all three appetites and when the appetites follow the well ordered judgments of practical reason, they are thereby brought into line with right reason and its perfection by prudence. But the passions of the sensitive appetite are not naturally obedient to all the directives of right reason; their obedience is achieved through habituation and the result of such habituation is the acquisition of the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude.

While this account might seem straightforward enough, scholars disagree on the precise nature of Thomas’s account of the virtuous habituation that disposes the sensitive appetites to be obedient to right reason. This difficulty is central to Giuseppe Butera’s 2006 « Mediaeval Studies » article, On Reason’s Control of the Passions in Aquinas’s Theory of Temperance. Many readers of Thomas are inclined to hold that virtuous sensitive appetites are habituated in such a way that they can automatically hit upon the mean of right action. That is to say, virtuous passions flow from sense appetites that are spontaneously inclined towards the good and no longer require the continuous attention of practical reason to direct these passions to the mean between excess and deficiency. Butera, however, argues that this is not Thomas’s position. On the contrary, virtuous passions are not habituated to desire automatically or spontaneously the appropriate mean of right action independent of additional directives of practical reason. Instead, he

5 Cf. QDVC, 5.1; ST, I-II.56.1-6; I-II.61.2.
7 Cf. ST, I.81.3; I-II.17.7; 24.3; 51.2-3; 59.1-5; 63.2; 77.1-2.
claims that virtuous passions always depend upon the verdict of right reason *hic et nunc*; hence, their habituation consists in being inclined to obey the immediate directives of right reason in every situation.

The first difficulty with the prior view, which I shall call the ‘theory of automatic virtuous passions’, is that it seems to imply that the passions are cognitive powers that know the right mean independent of practical reason. But for Aquinas, the passions do not know the mean for they are not cognitive but appetitive powers that are specified by the objects presented by sensation, imagination, and the cogitative power. In short, it is the cognitive powers that apprehend and determine the mean of right action, not the passions. A second difficulty is that the mean of right action is variable and context dependent, and since the passions do not cognize the variable mean they also cannot be habitually inclined to desire automatically the variable mean of right action.

The difficulties with the theory of automatic virtuous passions are further clarified by Butera’s helpful breakfast illustration. Let us suppose that Pip’s ordinary breakfast consists in the fairly light fare of tea and biscuits. Assuming that he is a virtuous young man, we must ask: does he have the virtue of temperance because through months of habituation his concupiscible appetite has grown accustomed to the regular verdict of right reason to desire a few biscuits and tea, and now his virtuous concupiscible appetite is automatically inclined towards the same mean of biscuits and tea, which no longer requires the continual judgments of reason? Or, does Pip possess the virtue of temperance because every morning he judges according to right reason that the sustenance required from this morning’s victuals will be adequately satisfied by a few biscuits and tea, which the passions of his concupiscible appetite follow habitually? Butera contends that only the second case aptly describes Thomas’s account of virtuous passions. This is because virtuous passions are not found in appetites that have become habituated to act according to a routine that, while they initially required the attention of right reason, can now function automatically and independently of practical reason’s constant attention. The significance of these two conflicting views becomes clearer if we look to those situations where right reason dictates that one should not follow one’s everyday routine.

While Pip’s regular fare suits him quite well, and his appetites are ordinarily satisfied, today is different. He has just received a furtive letter from his friend, Wemmick, indicating he must leave at once for a difficult and extended journey. According to right reason his morning meal should be increased so as to sustain him on his expedition, but if the passions of his concupiscible appetite have been habituated to the mean of the past judgments of right reason, they will not be in

harmony with the judgment of right reason that discerns a different mean for the irregular occasion. Hence, the theory of automatic virtuous passions would have Pip’s concupiscible appetite be habituated to desire less than what right reason judges here and now is needed to fulfill the great expectations of extraordinary circumstances. In contrast to the theory of automatic virtuous passions, Butera argues that, for Aquinas, our concupiscible appetite must instead be habituated with the virtuous inclination to follow immediately the dictates of right reason on any occasion, whether it is ordinary or extraordinary. Pip’s passions are virtuous because his concupiscible appetite is habitually inclined to follow the judgment of right reason no matter what the vicissitudes of fortune might throw in his way.10

Butera’s theory has some important implications for Thomas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. If virtuous passions can result only from the judgment of reason, then only consequent passions can be virtuous. Antecedent passions by definition turn out to be non-virtuous simply because they are prior to the judgment of reason. This does not mean that antecedent passions are vicious, but that a particular antecedent passion does not strictly speaking fall within the realm of being ‘moral’11. This is because for a passion to be moral, that is, for it to qualify as being a morally good or evil human action, it must be the result of a rational and voluntary action. Still, there are two obvious ways in which our antecedent passions figure into our moral life. First, one can be culpable for not cultivating temperance, which is a virtue that impedes the likelihood of vehement antecedent passions arising in the first place. Second, because many of our antecedent passions become consequent passions whenever the judgment of reason endorses the object initially desired by our antecedent passions, antecedent passions often influence the character of the consequent passions that follow the voluntary judgment of practical reason for which we are morally responsible.

This last point bears upon an important though frequently overlooked feature of Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. Those familiar with the Aristotelian distinction between continence and incontinence will recognize that antecedent passions — especially vehement antecedent passions — often distract or inhibit practical reason from determining what is truly good here and now. Nonetheless, Thomas does not hold that all antecedent passions incline us towards objects that are contrary to the goods of right reason. Indeed, antecedent

10 It is important to distinguish here between the somatic passion in the viscera that one perceives as hunger, from the psychic passion of concupiscence or desire for food. The somatic passion identified as hunger is caused by the nutritive appetite which cannot be directly commanded by practical reason and the will. Our focus, however, is on the psychic passions, which Thomas holds can be commanded by practical reason and will. Cf. ST, I-II.17.7-8.

11 Cf. DV, 25.5; DV, 26.6; ST, I-II.24.1-4.

12 Cf. ST, I-II.17.7; 59.2; 74.3-4; 75.2; 77.1-3; De malo, 3.9, esp. ad 7; 3.11.
passions might well incline us to an action that is good, and right reason will second that this object is to be desired as good\textsuperscript{13}. In such cases the antecedent passion for a good object is transformed into a consequent passion for the same object now judged to be good according to right reason\textsuperscript{14}. The best human actions, however, are those that are the most voluntary and so are initiated principally by practical reason and will. Whenever the object of a good or evil action is initially specified by the passions of the sensitive appetite it diminishes the voluntariness of the human action. For this reason Thomas holds that antecedent passions both diminish the goodness of a good action and mitigate the sinfulness of an evil action\textsuperscript{15}. The most complete human actions are performed principally on the basis of reason, not passion. Hence, the most exemplary human actions can only be cooperative with consequent passions, which is why the virtue of temperance disposes the concupiscible appetite to be inclined to be consequent to and obedient to the present judgment of right reason.

Clearly for Thomas the virtue of temperance conditions our concupiscible appetite to be inclined towards consequent passions, but does this virtue have any impact on our antecedent passions? It seems that it does not for the virtue of temperance principally inclines the appetite to consequent passions that are obedient to the judgment of reason. If the virtue of temperance also \textit{rightly ordered} the antecedent passions it would entail some version of the theory of automatic virtuous passions. Butera concurs, but he also contends that temperance has some regulation over antecedent passions.

« Far from ordering the antecedent passions of the virtuous, temperance either prevents them from arising in the first place or renders them so mild (but not necessarily ordered) as to prevent the temperate from ever having to fight their passions for mastery over their actions »\textsuperscript{16}.

In other words, Butera acknowledges that the virtue of temperance can have some impact on antecedent passions, albeit indirectly, but it cannot render them virtuous. It is important to distinguish between what the virtue of temperance

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. \textit{ST}, I-II.59.1.

\textsuperscript{14} The distinction between antecedent and consequent passions, however, is not a matter of temporality, that is, of one act prior to the other in time; rather, it is determined by causality. Consequent passions are caused by the judgment of reason, and these can be good or evil judgments of reason. Antecedent passions are caused by the specification of sensation, imagination, or the cogitative power prior to any judgment of reason, which might determine the initial specification to be right or wrong, good or evil.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. \textit{DV}, 26.6-7; \textit{ST}, I-II.24.3; 77.6-7.

\textsuperscript{16} \textsc{Butera}, \textit{On Reason's Control of the Passions in Aquinas's Theory of Temperance}, p. 158.
essentially habituates the appetite to, namely, consequent virtuous passions, and what it incidentally disposes the same appetite towards, which includes conditioning the character of the antecedent passions of the appetite. While such antecedent passions may or may not be condoned by right reason here and now, the virtue of temperance can enhance the quality of our antecedent passions. In addition to inclining our concupiscible appetite not to give rise to antecedent passions, temperance also impedes vehement antecedent passions, which can distract practical reason, such as we find in the case of incontinent and psychotic persons. In short, temperance cannot virtuously order antecedent passions but it can habituate our concupiscible appetite by either impeding antecedent passions or by rending them mild\textsuperscript{17}.

I believe that Butera's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas is correct and that it provides a more consistent exegesis of the textual evidence than the theory of automatic virtuous passions. Nevertheless, Butera takes note of a few unsettling consequences of his interpretation. The first difficulty with his interpretation is that it seems to be incapable of distinguishing between the passions of temperate and continent persons. We will return to this point at length in the second part. Another difficulty with his interpretation is that it seems to imply that virtuous passions can never influence our practical reasoning because they must always follow the judgment of right reason. This paints a somewhat cold and unaffected picture of Thomas's account of practical reasoning. It would entail that it is only after we have intended, deliberated, and decided what to do that virtuous passions can enter in subsequent to the final judgment of reason. Such a position seems to exclude virtuous passions from contributing anything positive to practical reason, because by definition virtuous passions are consequent passions that result from the final judgment of reason. The principal difficulties with this view are that it seems to militate against experience as well as Thomas's emphasis on the unity of the human person as a hylomorphic being whose different powers, when ordered properly, contribute to the perfection of human action\textsuperscript{18}. Indeed, contrary to such implications, it seems that rightly ordered moderate passions of desire, audacity, fear, and anger can attract our attention to the task at hand and motivate us to concentrate better as we deliberate and decide what to do\textsuperscript{19}. Pip's concern and fear that his benefactor, Magwitch, might get caught focuses his mind, and encourages him to deliberate carefully about various means to help Magwitch escape. This healthy fear also motivates Pip and his friend, Herbert, to be extra cautious both in their day-to-day activities and in their further deliberations and decisions about

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. \textsc{Butera}, \textit{On Reason's Control of the Passions in Aquinas's Theory of Temperance}, pp. 145-146, 159.
\textsuperscript{18} Cf. \textit{St}, I-II.24.3.
\textsuperscript{19} Cf. \textit{De malo}, 3.11 ; 12.1.
the best way to execute their intention to aid Magwitch. Without this anxiety Pip might well fail to exercise due caution; it would be a sign of carelessness if Pip did not deliberate with some trepidation about the most suitable way to execute his intended end to bring Magwitch to safety.

In his recent 2013 article, *Virtuous Deliberation and the Passions*, Steven Jensen has corroborated Butera’s interpretation of Thomas’s account of virtuous passions\textsuperscript{20}. He also shares Butera’s concern that such a view suggests Thomas excluded virtuous passions from having any positive impact on practical reasoning. Jensen aims to correct, or at least nuance, the latter implication of Butera’s theory by showing that Thomas’s theory does allow virtuous passions to be positively involved in our practical reasoning. He does this by focusing our attention on Thomas’s many uses of the notion the judgment of reason (*iudicium rationis*). Butera correctly emphasizes that virtuous passions must be subsequent to the judgment of reason, by which he seems to mean the judgment of choice (*iudicium electionis*), which I have called decision. What Jensen is keen to point out is that Butera does not consider that Thomas distinguishes many judgments of reason that are prior to the ‘final’ judgment of reason achieved at the phase of decision. This point is crucial, for consequent passions can also result from these prior judgments of reason. Indeed, Thomas distinguishes two ways in which consequent passions can follow the judgment of reason and both can contribute to the goodness of the moral act.

« There are two ways that the passions of the soul can be related to the judgment of reason. One way is *antecedently* [to the judgment of reason], and [in this way] they diminish the goodness of the act, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of our moral act depends. For it is more praiseworthy for someone to perform a work of charity from a judgment of reason, than from a passion of pity (*misericordiae*) alone. [The second] way is *consequently* [to the judgment of reason], and this [occurs] in two ways. One mode by way of redundancy, that is to say, because when the superior part of the soul is intensely moved towards something, the lower part [of the soul] also follows its movement. And so the passion that *consequently* exists in the sensitive appetite is a sign of the intensity of the will, and this indicates greater moral goodness. Another mode is by way of choice, such as when a human chooses from a judgment of reason to be affected by some passion in order to act more promptly by cooperating with the sensitive appetite. And such a passion of the soul adds to the goodness of an action »\textsuperscript{21}.


\textsuperscript{21} *ST*, I-II.24.3 ad 1.
Thomas notes two ways in which judgments of reason can move the sensitive appetites to consequent passions that are in conformity with the object sought by the will. First are the consequent passions that follow a judgment of reason and are moved by way of redundancy, and such judgments of reason are clearly not restricted to the judgment of choice, for the way of choice is the second more specific way in which consequent passions can follow a judgment of reason. Consequent passions by way of redundancy seem to result from the habitual inclination of the sensitive appetites to obey and follow the acts of practical reason and will, whereas the consequent passions by way of choice add additional specification to the former, namely, the person has consciously chosen by a judgment of practical reason to love, hate, desire, hope for, fear, or be angry with some thing. To grasp the full significance of this point we must briefly consider a few features of Aquinas’s theory of human action.

Thomas’s theory of human action is complex. In brief, he demarcates human action into a number of potential phases of confluent operations exercised by practical reason and will, which I shall distinguish as follows: wish, intention, deliberation, decision, execution, and enjoyment. While wishing, intending, and enjoying are principally concerned with the ends of rational voluntary actions, deliberation, decision, and execution are mostly concerned with the ad finem, that is, the subordinated ends or means to ends of rational and voluntary human actions. To be voluntarily inclined towards some end simpliciter is to wish; wishing is distinct from intending an end, for intention involves actually adopting and pursuing an end. Because all genuine acts of practical reason are oriented toward singular human actions that can be executed here and now, actual practical reasoning begins by voluntarily intending a particular end. But what is first in intention is last in execution; in order to achieve the end intended one must determine the subordinated ends and means to the end intended that can be performed here and now. Since it is not always obvious which means to the end must be chosen, one must often deliberate about the most suitable means to the end intended. After consenting to the most suitable means ordered to the end, one decides to pursue the most proximate means to the end. But this decision must actually be translated into human action; this is achieved by voluntarily performing the action, that is, by executing what one has decided to do. Finally,
once one has successfully executed an action and achieved the end itself, one rests in the good that has been obtained by enjoying it.

What is significant for us, is that Thomas clearly holds both that there are judgments of reason confluent to the voluntarily acts of the will in the phases of wishing, intending, deliberating, deciding, executing, and enjoying and that, by the way of redundancy, the consequent passions that result from any one of these judgments of reason can enhance the goodness of the moral act. Any consequent passion that results from a judgment of reason that consciously chooses or decides to love, hate, fear or be angry, is simply a more specific kind of consequent passion than those that are consequent to judgments of reason by way of redundancy. Accordingly, Jensen is right to argue that because there are judgments of reason prior to acts of decision, and all virtuous passions must be consequent passions following judgments of reason, there can indeed be virtuous passions prior to the rational judgment of choice, and that these virtuous passions can contribute to the deliberating phase of human action.

After establishing this last point Jensen goes on to address various exegetical difficulties with this interpretation; in particular, the manner in which such virtuous passions distract, inhibit, or enhance practical reason. These aspects of Thomas’s thought are adequately addressed by Jensen and are beyond the aims of this study. I shall instead focus on amplifying another aspect of the interpretation of Butera and Jensen that converges with our interest in moral perception and also addresses Butera’s concern regarding the difference between the passions of temperate and continent persons. What Jensen does not take up in any detail is the function of the cogitative power in the judgments of reason that cause virtuous consequent passions. This study aims to explicate in some detail the way in which the cogitative power composes and divides all the singular judgments of practical reason and presents the proper object of the sensitive appetites. Hence, it will be shown that the vis cogitativa is essential to Thomas’s doctrine of consequent virtuous passions. In order to defend these claims we will need to examine some additional features of Thomas’s philosophical anthropology.

The next section will address the following points: we must first situate Aquinas’s doctrine of practical reason within the wider context of his philosophical anthropology. I shall begin with a clarification of the distinctions between sensation, perception, and reason. Second, I shall explain the way in which particular reason and universal reason are both essential to an adequate presentation of Thomas’s notion of practical reason. This will bring us to the issue of moral perception in

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Thomas. It will be shown that particular reason, that is, the cogitative power, is responsible for forming particular judgments that intend singular ends, as well as for deliberating and deciding about singular means ordered to the particular ends of practical reason. Fourth, we will turn to the virtuous passions that are consequent to judgments of reason and will explicate the way in which the cogitative power is essential to Thomas’s doctrine of the obedience of the passions to judgments of reason. In this section we will contrast the moral perceptions of the cogitative power in antecedent passions from those consequent passions that follow the cogitative judgments of practical reason. Finally, these preceding points will provide us with the theoretical framework required to address Butera’s concern with the differences between the passions of temperate and continent persons in Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions.

II.1 SENSATION, PERCEPTION, AND REASON IN AQUINAS

The aim of this part is to clarify the doctrine of the *vis cogitativa* in Thomas’s philosophical anthropology; in particular, I shall focus on the differences between sensation, perception, and reason. Let us begin by surveying Aquinas’s doctrine of sensation, perception, imagination, memory, and reason.

Thomas differentiates all powers by their objects and operations. Accordingly, he follows Aristotle and takes for granted the polymorphic unity of the object of human cognition and immediately commences his philosophical anthropology by demarcating this multiform cognoscible into its different formal objects. Because all knowledge begins in the senses he starts with Aristotle’s division of sensibles from *De anima*, II, 6. The *per se* sensibles are distinguished into proper sensibles (color, sound, odor, flavor, tangibles) and common sensibles (motion, number, shape, magnitude), which are both set off against the *per accidens* sensibles, such as ‘the son of Diaries’. ‘The son of Diaries’ is not a *per se* sensible, but is a cognoscible object that is incidentally sensed concurrently with any essentially sensed visible, audible, shaped magnitude in motion. The well-known five external senses are differentiated by the five *per se* proper sensibles. The *per se* common sensibles do not provide the formal or proper object of any sense power because they are all sensed by more than one external sense power, such as visible motion by vision and audible motion by audition. Thomas holds that the *per se* proper and common sensibles taken together as a phenomenal unity or gestalt specify the lowest among the internal sense powers, which he calls the common sense (*sensus communis*)28. For the sake of parsimony, whenever

27 Cf. ST, I.77.3.
28 Cf. *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 2; *DV*, I.11; *In DA*, 13; *ST*, I.17.2; 78.3-4.
I speak of sensation I intend to denote the interconnected operations of the five external senses and the common sense, which, when taken together constitute what I shall call the external sensorium.

The retention and representation of these per se sensible forms is accomplished by the internal sense power Thomas calls imagination, which is not to be confused with wide variety of functions attributed to imagination by modern English speakers. For Aquinas, the power of imagination, in the strict sense, is restricted to retaining and forming visual, audible, olfactible, gustible, and tactile images of shaped, moving magnitudes.

The five external senses, common sense, and imagination all have one feature in common: they are all specified by a formal or proper object that is a kind of per se sensible form. Following Avicenna and Averroes, Aquinas also recognizes additional internal sense powers that do not have per se sensible forms as their proper object. Thomas acknowledges the ingenuity of Avicenna’s amplification of Aristotle’s identification of the per accidens sensibles apprehended simultaneously in acts of sensation of per se sensibles. It is here that we find the origins of what we might call Thomas’s doctrine of perception, which I shall distinguish sharply from all acts of sensation by the external senses and common sense, as well as from all acts of imagination. To incidentally sense per accidens sensibles is to apprehend intentions that are not captured by external sensations or by imagination.

« A per accidens [sensible] that is sensed does not affect the sense, neither inasmuch as it is a sense, nor inasmuch as it is this sense, but as conjoined to those things that affect the sense per se. As [for example] ‘Socrates’, and ‘the son of Diaries’, and ‘friend’, and other similar things, which are per se cognized in the universal by the intellect, and in the particular [they are per se cognized] by the cogitative power in human[s], and by the estimative in other animals. In this way then the external sense is said to sense, although per accidens, when from that which is sensed per se, the apprehensive power, whose [capacity] it is to cognize per se this thing cognized, apprehends it immediately without hesitation or discursion (statim sine dubitatione et discursu apprehendit). As [for example, when] we see that someone is alive from the fact that he speaks ».

The per accidens sensibles are cognoscible features of the thing which are not apprehended by any sense power but are cognized by some other cognitive power concurrently with the sensibles that are essentially sensed. In themselves these objects are not per se sensibles but are per se intentions, and according to


Aquinas, they are of two kinds: particular intentions and universal intentions. Particular intentions serve to differentiate the power Thomas calls the *estimative power* and *natural instinct* in nonhuman animals, but this power, as found in humans, is more often denoted by such diverse appellations as the *cogitative power*, *passive intellect*, and *particular reason*. Because the formal object of the cogitative power concerns the particular, here and now singular thing, event, or circumstantial features of a reality, this power takes its place among the sensory powers of man.

Particular intentions that take on the formal characteristic of the past specify the power of memory, which is the fourth and final internal sense power in Aquinas’s psychology. Thus, Thomas’s demarcation of sensory cognitive powers consists of five external senses and four internal senses. Because our focus is the cogitative power, I shall have very little to say about sensation, imagination, and memory in the rest of this paper, except by way of contrast with the operations of the cogitative power.

The aforementioned universal intentions are more commonly referred to as *intelligible species*, which are abstracted from the phantasms formed by the higher internal senses, namely, imagination, memory, and the cogitative power, or *concepts* expressed by acts of intellectual understanding. Such universal intelligibles serve to differentiate another cognitive power, namely, the intellect or more specifically, the *potential* or *possible intellect*. This power has for its object the abstract universal quiddity that transcends all particular existing instantiations of a common nature. But for Thomas, the intellect never exercises a complete act of understanding without turning to the phantasms.

Here we must take note of a crucial implicit distinction between Thomas’s generic and specific uses of the terms *phantasia* or *imaginatio* and *phantasmata*. Most readers of Thomas tend to interpret these notions in a specific and restrictive sense that refers to the power of imagination alone, to the exclusion of memory and the cogitative power. A closer reading of Thomas’s use of these notions reveals

31 Cf. *In DA*, II.13; *ST*, I.78.4.
32 «... quod passivus intellectus, de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est intellectus possibilis, sed ratio particularis, quae dicitur vis cogitativa ... », *In IV Sent.*, d. 50.1.1 ad 3 (Parma ed., vol. VII, pt. 2, p. 1248). For further references to the vis cogitativa, see: *In III Sent.*, d. 26.1.2; *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2 a. 2; *DV*, 1.11; 10.5; 15.1 ad 9; *SCG*, II. 60; 73; 76; 81.3; *QDdA*, 13; *ST*, I.78.4. For the intellectus passivus, see: *SCG*, II.60 and 73; *ST*, I.79.2 ad 2; I-II.51.3; *QDdA*, 13; *QDSC*, 9. For the ratio particularis, see: *In II Sent.*, d. 24.2.1 ad 3; *In IV Sent.*, d. 50.1.1 ad 3; *DV*, 2.6; 10.5; 14.1 ad 9; 15.1; *SCG*, II.60; *In IV Ethic.*, lt. 7; lt. 9; *In DA*, III.10 (Leon. ed., p. 251.128-133, *ad* 434a16); *ST*, I.20.1 ad 1; 78.4; 79.2 ad 2; 81.2 ad 3; I-II. 30.3 ad 3; 51.3.
33 Cf. *ST*, I.78.3-4.
34 Cf. *ST*, I.79.2; 84.6-8; 85.1-2.
that more often than not he follows the practice of his Aristotelian contemporaries and uses these notions in a generic way that indicates by synecdoche the complex interplay of the formation of phantasms by the three highest powers within his psychology of internal sensation, namely, imagination, cogitation, and memory. Indeed, Thomas often explicitly states that, « the powers in which the phantasms reside [are] imagination, memory, and cogitation »\textsuperscript{35}. In short, for Thomas the terms \textit{imaginatio} and \textit{phantasia}, as well as \textit{phantasmata} are frequently employed in a generic sense that refers to the concert operations of the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers\textsuperscript{36}. Collectively I shall refer to these three internal sense powers as the \textit{internal sensorium} in contrast to the \textit{external sensorium}, which includes the five external senses as well as the lowest internal sense power, namely, the \textit{sensus communis}. This division can be schematized as follows:

| External senses: | Five external senses  |
| Internal senses: | Common sense, imagination, cogitation, memory |
| External sensorium: | Five external senses and common sense  |
| Internal sensorium: | Imagination, cogitation, memory |

The importance of this last point concerning Thomas’s generic use of \textit{phantasia} and \textit{phantasmata} will be made clearer in the next section when we turn our attention to the function of the cogitative power in practical reason, the intellect’s reflection upon the phantasms formed by the cogitative power, and the cogitative phantasms that move the sensitive appetites. But before we attend to this issue we must address a few points concerning the unity of human operations in Thomas’s philosophical anthropology.

Even though Thomas’s philosophical anthropology consists in a complex differentiation of cognitive powers, operations, and objects, we should not

\textsuperscript{35} «... sed a virtutibus in quibus sunt phantasmata, scilicet imaginativa, memorativa et cogitativa ...	extsc{CG}, II.73 (1501). See also, «... in viribus sensitivis, scilicet imaginativa, cogitativa et memorativa ... Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in prae senti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis », \textsc{ST}, I.89.5. « Huius autem cogitativae virtutis est distinguere intentiones individuales, et comparare eas ad invicem : sicut intellectus qui est \textit{separatus et immixtus}, comparat et distinguit inter intentiones universales. Et quia per hanc virtutem, simul cum imaginativa et memorativa, praeparatur phantasmata ut recipiant actionem intellectus agentis, a quo fiunt intelligibilia actu », \textsc{SCG}, II.60 (1370). See also, \textsc{DV}, 18.8 ; ad 4 ; ad 5 ; \textsc{ST}, 1.78.4.obj. 6 and ad 6 ; I-II.56.5. obj. 1 and ad 1 ; \textsc{QDdA}, 20, sed contra ad 1 (Leon. ed., pp. 176.465 - 175.478) ; \textit{In DM}, 3 (Leon. ed., p. 116.272-281, \textsc{ad} 451a14).

\textsuperscript{36} I have defended these theses at length in D. De Haan, \textit{A Less Imaginative Account of Phantasia in Thomas Aquinas: A Study on the Vis Cogitativa}, (forthcoming); Io., \textit{Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts}, « American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly », 88/3, 2014, pp. 397-437.
overlook his emphasis on the unity of these operations that are exercised by one subject, the human person. Contrary to many misinterpretations of his powers psychology, Thomas frequently insists that we should not be mislead by his use of synecdoche; for it is not the cogitative power that perceives or the concupiscible appetite that loves, but the human person that perceives and loves by virtue of their cogitative and concupiscible powers\(^\text{37}\).

We have already noted the confluent operations of the intellect and will in the earlier summation of Thomas’s theory of human action. This inextricable confluence of cognitional operations specifying appetitive operations by final causality, and the efficient causality of appetitive operations drawing the person to the object known and sought, applies as much to sensation, perception, and passions, as it does to reason and will. For the passions of the two sensitive appetites, which Thomas calls the concupiscible and irascible appetites, are always specified by the cognitive objects apprehended by sensation, imagination, and the cogitative power\(^\text{38}\). Indeed, not only are the cognitive and appetitive powers so united in their operations, but Thomas also contends that the operations of numerous cognitive and appetitive powers can be united all together in a single human action, insofar as the acts of the diverse powers are all subordinated to the action of a superior power, in this case, practical reason and will. For in such cases the acts of seeing, hearing, cogitatively perceiving and the emotions of loving or fearing are themselves passions that proceed from the action of the will. So even though Thomas distinguishes the formal differences among diverse powers, habits, operations, and objects; still, because all these acts proceed from one first principle, which is the action of the will, they all constitute one human action. For just as the blacksmith, Joe, does not perform one action of his own, and his hammer another, and his anvil yet another, but rather these instruments are material participants in the formal action of the agent, Joe, so also the lower powers all participate in a subordinated instrumental fashion to the formal action of the will\(^\text{39}\). Hence, when the lower powers act through their participation in the

\(^{37}\) Cf. *DV*, 2.6 ad 3; 10.9 ad contra 3; 22.13 ad 7; *QDSC*, 10, ad 15; *In DA*, I.10 (Marietti ed., n. 152); *QDdA*, 12 ad 13; *ST*, I.75.2 ad 2; 75.4; I-II.17.5 ad 2; II-II.58.2.

\(^{38}\) Cf. *ST*, I.80.1-2; 81.1-2; 82.3; 83.3; I-II.9.1; 12.1; 13.1; 15.1; 16.1; 17.1; 22.2-3.

\(^{39}\) Cf. *DV*, 14.5; *ST*, I-II.17.4; III.19.1-2; *De Unione Verbi incarnati*, 5. This specification of the lower by the higher also applies to the operations of the virtues. « Similarly when reason commands the lower powers, such as the irascible and concupiscible [appetites], that in the habit of the concupiscible [appetite] which is from the part of the concupiscible [appetite], namely, a certain inclination to the use of desirable objects, is akin [to what is] material in temperance; however, the order, which is of reason, and the rectitude, are akin [to what is] formal [in temperance]. And this is the same in the other moral virtues », *DV*, 14.5 (Leon. ed., pp. 452.152 - 453.160).
action of the higher agent, namely, reason and will, then the acts of the lower and higher powers are united as one operation of the human person.

To summarize, Thomas recognizes that whenever the operations of the sensitive powers are informed and integrated into the acts of reason and will there occurs not just an act of seeing, but a voluntary act of seeing, not just an act of cogitative perception, but a voluntary act of perceiving, and not just a passion of love, concupiscence, or anger, but a voluntary passion of love, concupiscence, and anger. And because it is a voluntary action that flows from the will it is also rational, inasmuch as all objects of the will — the intellectual appetite — are specified by practical reason. Humans do not merely see, perceive, love, and desire, for reason transforms and rationalizes sensitive acts of seeing, perceiving, loving, and desiring, insofar as the human person rationally and voluntarily decides to perform such operations. Finally, because the actuality of all human operations and powers — including reason and will — depend upon the abiding actuality of the rational supposit or human person, it is more accurate to say, not that the panoply of human powers are autonomous agents acting on their own, but that there is one agent, the human person, who — by virtue of their diverse powers — sees, hears, perceives, desires, reasons, and decides in one unified human action.

II.2 Practical Reason in Aquinas: The Co-Operative Unity of Particular and Universal Reason

In the previous section we surveyed Thomas’s division of cognitive powers, noted his generic use of phantasia, and concluded with a cursory presentation of his account of the unity of human action through diverse powers. In this section we shall show that Thomas’s doctrine of practical reason cannot be adequately understood without grasping the way in which the cogitative power contributes to the acts of phantasia that are subordinate to and participate within the unified action that flows from practical reason and will. Let us begin with Thomas’s division of practical reason into the particular reason and universal reason.

We have already noted Thomas’s distinction between the cogitative power and the possible intellect, which he distinguishes on the basis of their different formal objects, namely, particular intentions and universal intentions, respectively. In such contexts Thomas often refers to the cogitative power as the ‘particular reason’ (ratio particularis) because it collates individual intentions (intentionem individualium), just as universal reason (ratio universalis) collates universal notions.

For a detailed treatment of these features of Thomas’s theory of human action, see S. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, T&T Clarke, Edinburgh 1998.
Aquinas on moral perception and the vis cogitativa

But this distinction between particular and universal reason has more than a mere nominal significance, for he often introduces the distinction to illuminate the unified co-operation of the cogitative power and possible intellect in practical reasoning. While the speculative intellect concentrates on universals, practical reasoning must be oriented to the concrete particulars of human action, and for this task the possible intellect alone is insufficient. This is because the possible intellect only directly apprehends, judges, and reasons about universals. In order to cognize particulars, practical reason must draw upon the apprehensions, judgments, and discursive operations of the cogitative power, which does cognize the singular intentions that are integral to practical reasoning and human action. Thomas consistently teaches this doctrine as early as his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and as late as the Secunda Pars of the Summa theologiae and his contemporaneous commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

« As is said in De anima book three, the practical intellect, in order that it may administer to singular [things], needs the particular reason, by means of which a universal opinion, which is in the intellect, is applied to a particular action. Thus there is a syllogism whose major is universal, which is the opinion of practical intellect, and [whose] minor is singular, which is the estimation of the particular reason — which by another name is called the cogitative power — and [whose] conclusion consists in the choice of the action. »

Most interpretations of Thomas take practical reason to be an operational orientation that belongs exclusively to the possible intellect — which some passages do indeed suggest. A closer investigation of Aquinas’s more detailed treatments of practical reason, however, reveals that his account is subtler. For Thomas, ‘practical reason’ is a metonymical notion that indicates a concert operation achieved by the unified acts of the cogitative power subordinated to the practical orientation of the possible intellect. We find this doctrine articulated in his commentary on the passage just mentioned from book three of the De anima.

41 « Si uero apprehendatur in singulari, ut puta <si>, sum view coloratum, percipio hunc hominem uel hoc animal, huius modi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per uim cogitatium, quid dicitur etiam ratio particularis eo quod est collatius intentionum individuialium sicut ratio universalis est collatius rationum universalium, nichilominus tamen hec uis est in parte sensitiua, quia uis sensitiua in sui supremo participat aliquid de ui intellectuia in homine, in quo sensus intellectui coniungitur », In DA, II.13 (Leon. ed., pp. 121.191 - 122.201).
43 Cf. ST, I.79.11.
The question Thomas is addressing is: what kind of reason initiates movement? After eliminating speculative reason he turns to practical reason.

« Practical reason, however, is partially universal and is partially particular (Ratio autem practica quedam est uniuersalis et quedam particularis). The universal is like that which says that such a person must do such a thing: for instance, that a son must honor his parent. Particular reason, however, [says] that this is such and I am such — e.g., that I the son should now display this honor to my parent. The latter opinion produces movement at this time, and not the opinion that is universal. Or, if both produce movement, then that which is universal does so as the cause that is first and at rest, whereas the particular does so as the cause that is proximate and in a certain way attached to what is being moved. For operations and movements concern particulars. Hence for a movement to follow, a universal opinion must be applied to the particulars. And on this account, too, fault in actions occurs when an opinion about particular things to be done is corrupted on account of some pleasure or some other passion, although still that passion does not corrupt the universal opinion. »

The relevance of Thomas’s account of the unity of human action through the subordination of the operations of lower powers to higher powers becomes clearer in this passage. It is because the cogitative power qua particular reason is able to participate in the discursive reasoning of the possible intellect that it can act as an instrument subordinate to universal reasoning. Acting as first cause the universal reason and the subordinated act of the particular reason function cooperatively in the single unified operation of practical reasoning. This why Thomas can insist that the practical syllogism of practical reason consists in a universal major formed by the possible intellect, a singular minor presented by the cogitative power, and the conclusion, which is the decision to act. This integrated operation of the universal and particular reason also provides the human person with the ability to identify themselves as an individual subject with individual desires and obligations that fall under certain universal percepts. Thomas’s example is of practical reason’s integration of the universal precept to honor one’s parents, with the particular identification that I am a son, who ought to honor my parents here and now.

In short, without the sublimation of particular reason within practical reason, Thomas’s account of practical reasoning about singular actions would

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45 Cf. In IV Sent., d. 50, 1. a. 3 ad 3 in contrarium; DV, 10.5; 14.1, ad 9; ST, I.78.4 ad 5; I-II.30.3 ad 3.
be inexplicable — a charge that is frequently made by critics who fail to observe the function Aquinas ascribes to the *vis cogitativa* in many of his most prominent treatments of practical reasoning\(^46\). Because Thomas unequivocally restricts the possible intellect’s formal objects to universals, many of his readers have difficulties reconciling this restriction with his doctrine of practical reason, and its capacity to intend singular ends and to deliberate and decide about singular operables, that is, individual human actions. When the cogitative power is completely omitted from the story, the critics' objections seem to be directly on target. We have shown to the contrary how far off the mark such interpretations are, for Thomas clearly holds that practical reason integrates the cognition of universals and particulars obtained by universal and particular reason, and their operations constitute a unified human action insofar as the inferior power is ordered by the higher power. In order to elucidate further these commonly omitted details of Thomas’s account of practical reason the next section will address the function of the *ratio particularis* in the moral perception of individual means and ends of human action.

### II.3 Ratio Particularis and the Moral Perception of Individual Means and Ends

Since the salient function performed by the *ratio particularis* in practical reasoning is especially emphasized in Thomas’s treatment of prudence, we will begin this section by investigating various passages that focus on the ways in which the virtue of prudence perfects practical reason. Now if prudence is truly to enhance the human person’s ability to reason practically, then it must not only perfect universal reason, but the particular reason as well\(^47\). This is why Thomas includes the perfection of the internal senses among the integrated parts of prudence in *Summa theologiae*, II-II.49. In the *Summa* Thomas unequivocally identifies memory as one of the internal sense powers perfected by prudence; however, he is less explicit about which internal sense powers can intelligently apprehend particulars and reason about singulars\(^48\). In reply to the first objection of *ST*, II-II.49.2, Thomas writes:

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\(^{47}\) Cf. *DV*, 14.5 ad 11; *ST*, II-II.47.1-3.

\(^{48}\) See *ST*, II-II.49.1 for memory, and 49.2 and 5 for particular intelligence and reason, respectively.
«The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular operable, to which it applies universal cognition... But the singular conclusion is syllogized from universal and singular propositions. Hence, the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. One [kind of understanding] cognizes universals, which pertains to the intellect... But the other [kind of] understanding, as stated in book six of the *Ethics*, cognizes an extreme, that is, of some primary singular and contingent operable, namely, the minor premise, which must be singular in the syllogism of prudence... Now this primary singular is some singular end... Hence, the understanding that is posited as part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.»

This is followed by his response to the third objection:

«The right estimate concerning a particular end is called both *understanding*, inasmuch as it [pertains to] a principle, and *sense*, inasmuch as it [pertains to] a particular. And this is what the Philosopher says in book six of the *Ethics*, “Of these, namely, of singulars, [we] must have sense, and this is understanding”. But this is not to be understood [as indicating] the particular sense by which we cognize proper sensibles, but [as indicating] the interior sense by which we judge of a particular.»

In these two passages Thomas at least hints that the power responsible for judging singulars is the cogitative power for he both denies that it belongs to an external sense power and asserts that it is an *estimating* faculty, which is proper to the cogitative power. When we turn to his more extended commentary on the parallel passage just mentioned from *Nicomachean Ethics*, book VI, we find an explicit identification of these practical operations concerning singulars with the acts of the cogitative power or particular reason.

In his commentary, Thomas distinguishes between understanding speculative and practical ultimate first principles, which serve as the point of departure for speculative and practical reason. Among the first principles and ultimates of practical reason there are the universal unchanging first principles of the practical intellect, such as *synderesis*; but practical reason must also consider another kind of ultimate that is singular and contingent, as well as another kind of proposition, not simply the universal which is the major premise in the practical syllogism, but also the particular of the minor premise in the practical syllogism. This kind of cognition of singulars is called understanding because it is concerned with first principles, namely, the singular first principles *qua* ends or final causes of human

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49 ST, II-II.49.2 ad 1.
50 ST, II-II.49.2 ad 3.
action. Now practical reason must have some understanding of these singular principles, and because such singular intentions are cognized by the cogitative power, it belongs to the cogitative power to understand the singular ends and first principles of human action. And this is also why Thomas says that prudence belongs to the internal sense power called the cogitative or estimative power and particular reason; for as an integral part of practical reason, the operations of the cogitative power must also be perfected by prudence. This holds for the potential parts of prudence as well, that is to say, the particular reason is also perfected by the virtues of euboulia (which perfects practical deliberation), synesis, and gnome (which perfect practical understanding and decisions concerning ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, respectively). Accordingly, the cogitative power is called understanding, insofar as it forms absolute judgments concerning singulars, by virtue of which it also participates in the judgments of practical reason perfected by synesis, gnome, and prudence. But the cogitative power is called particular reason insofar as it cogitates discursively from one singular to another or even by way of one singular taken under the universal, and so it is also sublimated within the deliberative operations of practical reason, which are perfected by euboulia.

Thomas’s numerous contentions concerning the particular reason’s understanding of singular ends of human action and its discursive deliberation and singular judgments concerning the means of human action bear directly upon the issue of moral perception of means and ends. Let us first recall the aforementioned phases of human action: wish, intention, deliberation, decision, execution, and enjoyment. Intention concerns the ends of human action, whereas deliberation and decision regard the means ordered to the ends of human action.

51 « Et ad istum sensum, id est interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium, unde et animalia bruta quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dicuntur participare prudentia ... », In VI Ethic., 7 (Leon. ed., p. 359.255-260, ad 1142a25) ; « Et, quia singularia proprie cognoscuntur per sensum, oportet quod homo horum singularium quae dicimus esse principia et extrema, habeat sensum non solum exteriorem, sed etiam interiorem, cuius supra dixit esse prudentiam, scilicet vim cogitativam sive aestimativam quae dicitur ratio particularis ; unde hic sensus vocatur intellectus qui est circa singularia, et hunc Philosophus vocat in III De anima intellectum passivum, qui est corruptibilis », In VI Ethic., 9 (Leon. ed., p. 367.178-186, ad 1143a35).


53 « Est autem considerandum circa ea quae hic dicta sunt quod, sicut pertinent ad intellectum absolutum in universalibus iudicium de primis principiis, ad rationem autem pertinent discursus a principiis in conclusiones, ita etiam circa singularia vis cogitativa hominis vocatur intellectus, secundum quod habet absolutum iudicium de singularibus ; unde ad intellectum dicit pertinent prudentiam et synesim et gnomy ; dicitur autem ratio particularis secundum quod discurrat ab uno in alio, et ad hanc pertinet eubulia, quam Philosophus his non connumeravit nec dixit eam esse extremorum », In VI Ethic., 9 (Leon. ed., p. 368.239-251, ad 1143b11).
Now practical reason cannot be oriented towards universal means and ends alone, for human actions are singular and occur in the concrete here and now. This is why practical reason must also attend to the ways in which particular means and ends fall under universal means and ends. We have just seen that Thomas ascribes such responsibilities to the operations of the *ratio particularis*. Hence, because it understands the singular ends of practical action, the cogitative power not only participates in practical reason’s deliberations and decisions about means ordered to the ends, the particular reason must also contribute to the phase of human action whereby we *intend* an end. And though there is less textual evidence to support it, we might, by parry of reasoning, also infer that Thomas is committed to the cogitative power’s participation in any acts of practical reason whereby we might *wish* for a singular thing or *enjoy* a particular good that has been obtained through the *execution* of some human action.

Thus far our treatment of particular reason’s participation within practical reason’s intention of a singular end and deliberation and decision about a singular means ordered to this end has provided a robust framework for addressing the topic of *moral perception* in Thomas Aquinas — a turn of phrase he never uses. In order to define this helpful, though somewhat anachronistic, notion of moral perception, we must begin with the notion of perception, and for this I return again to Thomas’s doctrine of *per accidens* sensation.

The external sensorium apprehends objects that Aristotelians call *per se* sensibles, that is, both proper and common sensibles, but there are additional cognoscible features of the world that are accidental to *per se* sensibles and are not apprehended by the external sensorium, namely, the so-called *intentiones non sensatae*. These *per accidens* sensibles or intentions not sensed are, however, simultaneously apprehended by other cognitive powers in the same cognitive subject. When these intentions are particular they are grasped by the cogitative power, and when they are universal they are grasped by the possible intellect. It is important to note, moreover, that the acts of the cogitative power and possible intellect are only called *per accidens* sensations when their own *per se* operations are simultaneous to acts of external sensation sensing *per se* sensibles. I shall call the *per se* operations of...
the cogitative power and intellect that function independently of any simultaneous acts of sensation, acts of thinking. By way of contrast, I shall call the per accidens cognitions of the cogitative power and intellect acts of perception.

Acts of cogitative and intellective perception are inextricably tethered to simultaneous acts of sensation. Similarly, acts of cogitative and intellective thinking can be, but need not be, concurrent with thinking through the medium of images. Such thinking with images occurs principally in two ways: either by forming linguistic images (often audible images), such as when one speaks to oneself, or by forming visual, audible, olfactory, gustable, or tactile images of what one is thinking about. In other words, the per se sensibles and per se imaginables of the lower sense powers are material with respect to the particular and universal intentions that are the per se or formal objects of cogitative and intellective perception. These two different kinds of material objects require that we distinguish two kinds of per accidens cognition for the cogitative power and intellect, namely, incidental sensation and incidental imagination. As we have seen, Thomas explicitly mentions the first kind of per accidens cognition in numerous passages, but the second analogous case of per accidens cognition is made only implicit within various passages that distinguish the kind of cognitive apprehension that is required to move the appetites.

«Just as it is with intelligible things, insofar as that which is apprehended does not move the will unless it is apprehended under the notion of good or evil — because the speculative intellect says nothing about seeking or fleeing, as is said in De anima book three — so also is it in the sensitive part, which apprehends sensibles that do not cause any movement unless they are apprehended under the notion

55 Thomas also ascribes acts of thinking or cogitating to the cogitative power and intellect, though I do not intend to exclude resting in the truth from acts of thinking simpliciter as Thomas does in the following passage. « Et secundum hoc cogitatio proprie dicitur motus animi deliberantis nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis. Sed quia talis motus potest esse vel animi deliberantis circa intentiones universales, quod pertinet ad intellectivam partem; vel circa intentiones particulares, quod pertinet ad partem sensitivam: ideo cogitare secundo modo sumitur pro actu intellectus deliberantis; tertio modo, pro actu virtutis cogitativae », ST, II-II.2.1.

56 N.B., Thomas never uses the term perceptio or any of its cognates in such a restricted sense; rather, he prefers to use it in a variety of different contexts as an analogous cognitional term that often means to grasp or apprehend by the external senses, the internal senses, the intellect, or even through a cognitive act that belongs to the whole, that is the anima or psychological subject. See, for example, DV, 10.6; 8-10.

57 A similar distinction between the material and formal objects of the cogitative power is argued for at length in M. Barker, Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions: Nature and Classification, «International Philosophical Quarterly», 52/2, 2012, pp. 199-226. Barker’s account seems to be slightly different from my own insofar as I emphasize that Thomas allows for acts of the cogitative power and intellect that do not require a material object provided by sensation or imagination, which I have described as acts of cogitative and intellective thinking, in contrast to cogitative and intellective perceiving, which does require a material object.
of the suitable or unsuitable. And therefore it is said in De anima book two that [concerning those things] which are in the imagination in this way, we are as if we were considering some terrible things in paintings, which would not excite a passion of either fear or any similar [passion]. Now the power that apprehends such notions as the suitable and the not suitable seems to be the estimative power, through which the lamb flees the wolf and follows its mother »

Thomas repeats this point in his commentary on book two of the De anima, and such passages confirm that there is some kind of per accidens imagination analogous to per accidens sensation exercised by the estimative power. This is needed because just as mere sensible forms apprehended by the external sensorium do not of themselves move the sensitive appetites, but require the additional estimation of the cogitative power or intellect via acts of incidental sensation, so also mere retained sensible forms or images apprehended by imagination do not move the sensitive appetites, but must be estimated as suitable or unsuitable by the cogitative power or intellect by acts of incidental imagination. This subtle point bears reiterating: if the object that is material with respect to the formal object that is cogitatively or intellectively perceived is a per se sensible thing that is sensed, then the perceptual act is a kind of per accidens or incidental sensation. But if the material object with respect to the formal object of a cogitative or intellective act of thinking is some per se image (visible, audible, olfactible, gustible, or tactible) formed by imagination, then the act of thinking in the medium of images is analogously called a kind of per accidens or incidental imagination.

Hence, acts of moral perception consist in acts of incidental sensation exercised by the cogitative power or intellect. But what makes such acts of perception moral? In order to answer this question we must further delineate the different kinds of intentions cognized by the cogitative power and intellect.

59 *Secundam rationem ponit ibi: Amplius autem cum opinamur etc. Quel talis est: ex opinone statim sequitur passio in appetitu, quia, cum opinamur aliquid esse graue uel terrible, statim compatimur tristando uel timendo, et similiter si aliquid sit confidendum, id est de quo debeat aliquid confidere et sperare, statim sequitur spes uel gaudium; set ad fantasiam non sequitur passio in appetitu, quia, dum appareit aliquid nobis secundum fantasiam, similiter nos habemus ac si consideraremus in pictura aliqua terribilia uel sperabilia; ergo opinio non est idem quod fantasia. Huius autem differencie ratio est quia appetitus non patitur neque mouetur ad simplicem apprehensionem rei qualem proponit fantasia, set oportet quod apprehendatur sub ratione boni uel mali, convenientis uel nocivae, et hoc facit opinio in hominibus, componendo et diuidendo, cum opinamur hoc esse terribile uel malum, illud autem esse sperabile uel bonum, fantasia autem non componit nec diuidit; patitur tamen appetitus animalium ab estimatione naturali, que hoc operatur in eis quod opinio in hominibus*, In DA, II.28 (Leon. ed., p. 191.262-284, ad 427b21) (Marietti ed., III.4. nn. 634-635).
Thomas distinguishes the judgments of the cogitative power and intellect that do not move the appetites, from those that do. He observes that some acts of the cogitative power and intellect identify what I call aspectual characteristics of the thing, such as, for example, that this colored, moving magnitude is Socrates, or the son of Diaries, or a friend. The cogitative power also allows rational animals to apprehend this man as falling under the common nature human and this piece of wood as a piece of wood, or to identify that this speaking thing is alive. But none of these aspectual intentions grasped by the cogitative power and intellect are sufficient to move the appetites, for as we saw before, Thomas often remarks that, «just as imaging forms without any estimation of fittingness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does apprehension of the truth without the notion of the good and appetitible [move the will]. Hence the speculative intellect does not move [the will], but the practical intellect». This is why, in addition to aspectual intentions, Thomas also ascribes to the intellect and cogitative power the ability to register a variety of behavioral orientations or operables. In fact, he even attributes such actional intentions to nonhuman animals so as to account for the sheep’s ability to estimate that the lamb is able-to-be-nursed and that the grass is able-to-be-eaten. And even though the estimative power of nonhuman animals is incapable of identifying individuals under a common nature, the estimative power or natural instinct does allow them to evaluate actional intentions that specify actions or passions that might, depending on the context, then be estimated as actions or passions to be pursued or avoided, which cause affections in the sensitive appetites. In other words, the

60 « Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitatiua et estimatiua : nam cogitatiua apprehendit indiuiduum ut existentem sub natura communi, quod contingit ei in quantum unitur intellectuie in eodem subiecto, unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum ... », In DA, II.13 (Leon. ed., p. 122.205-211, ad 418a20). Hence, contrary to George Klubertanz, I think it is quite obvious that Thomas acknowledges that the cogitative power can apprehend particular intentions that identify individual substances — which I call aspectual intentions — as well as operabilia — which I distinguish into actional and affectional intentions. See, De Haan, Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts. For Klubertanz’s interpretation of Aquinas, see G. Klubertanz, The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis cogitativa According to St. Thomas Aquinas, The Modern Schoolman, St. Louis 1952, ch. 9. For a brief critique of Klubertanz’s misinterpretation of particular intentions in Aquinas, see A. Lisska, A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology, « Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association », 80, 2006, pp. 1-19.

61 ST, I-II.9.1 ad 2.

62 « ...estimatiua autem non apprehendit aliquod indiuiduum secundum quod est sub natura communi, set solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis uel passionis, sicutouis cognoscit hunc agnum non in quantum est hic agnus, set in quantum est ab ea lactabilis, et hanc herbam in quantum est eius cibus ; unde illa indiuidua ad que se non extendit eius actio uel passio, nullo modo apprehendit sua estimatiua naturali : naturalis enim estimatiua datur animalibus ut per eam ordinetur in actiones proprias uel passiones prosequeandas uel fugiendas », In DA, II.13 (Leon. ed., p. 122.211-222).
Actional intentions of rational and other animals allow them to estimate what they are able to do in a particular circumstance, whereas affectional intentions construe some action or passion as suitable or unsuitable, beneficial or harmful, easy or arduous, desirable or terrifying, and such affectional intentions can excite passions in the sensitive appetites. Thomas identifies what I have called affectional intentions with the estimative power’s imperfect analogue to the intellect’s act of command (imperium). He notes that even though the estimative power in nonhuman animals cannot command the appetites to move by a rational order, the affectional intentions of natural instinct do specify an impulse to action (impetus ad opus), which move the passions.

Let us recapitulate this account of perception and particular intentions in a more systematic fashion. By cogitative perception I mean an act of the cogitative power that is tied to an act of sensation and so is an incidental sensation. There are also acts of cogitative thinking that are tethered to acts of imagination; these are acts of incidental imagination. We have also seen that Thomas ascribes to the cogitative power the ability (1) to identify a thing as an individual, (2) to estimate a spectrum of behaviors by which the animal might act or react to the identified thing, and (3) to evaluate whether so acting or reacting is suitable or unsuitable, good or evil, arduous or easy to accomplish, which specifies an impulse that moves the concupiscible and irascible appetites. Accordingly, I have distinguished the particular intentions perceived by the cogitative power into (1) aspectual intentions, (2) actional intentions, (3) and affectional intentions, respectively. We have also seen that Thomas thinks the cogitative power’s operations can be perfected by the insights, judgments, and reasoning of the intellect.


64 «AD QUINTUM dicendum quod illum eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis ; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam fluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires [quam aestimativa et memorativa], sed eodem, perfectiores quam sint in alis animalibus », ST, I.78.4ad5. « Ad nonum dicendum quod potentia cogitativa est id quod est altissimum in parte sensitiva, unde attingit quodam modo ad partem intellectivam ut aliquid participet eius quod est in intellectiva parte infimum, scilicet rationis discursuum, secundum regulam Dionysii quam dicit VII cap. De divinis nominibus, quod ‘principia secundorum coniunguntur finibus primorum’ ; unde etiam ipsa vis cogitativa vocatur particularis ratio, ut patet a Commentatore in III De anima, nec est nisi in homine, loco cuius in aliis brutis est estimatio naturalis. Et ideo quandoque ipsa etiam universalis ratio, quae est in parte intellectiva, propter similitudinem operationis a cogitatione nominatur », DV, 14.1 ad 9 (Leon. ed., pp. 438.263 - 439.277).
the person to identify the individual thing as falling under the common nature of a natural (or artificial) kind⁶⁵. Actional intentions are integrated into intellectually understood operables that specify the range of actions and reactions available to the rational agent in various circumstances. Finally, affectional intentions are sublimated into the axiological judgments concerning universal, real and apparent goods or evils, and the host of acquired moral precepts that specify the will. This integration of affectional and axiological intentions allows the individual person, as was quoted above, to judge that I am a child who should obey a universal precept by honoring my parents in such-and-such way here and now because it is good⁶⁶.

Each of these distinct cogitative and intellective intentions provide additional specifications to the prior intentions in the series, which results in a final judgment whose cumulative construal determines what ought to be done with respect to such-and-such a thing. The order here is significant, for it is only after one has identified what some thing is by aspectual and categorical intentions, that one can then determine what-to-do with respect to this thing by actional intentions and universal operables. Finally, the affectional intentions and axiological judgments of universal moral precepts register that such an action or reaction is suitable or unsuitable, good or evil, and that it ought-to-be-done, which specifies the sensual and intellectual appetites.

Given this complex analysis of moral perception, a word of caution is needed. Even though we can distinguish among cogitative and intellective intentions, it does not follow that each intention specifies a completely autonomous operation that is disconnected from the others. For just as the diverse operations of different powers can be unified together into a single human action, so a fortiori can the distinct intentions formed by the cogitative power or intellect coalesce together into one integrated judgment that construes here and now what-ought-to-be-done-with-respect-to-this-kind-of-thing. This makes distinguishing the cumulative layers among aspectual, actional, and affectional intentions very difficult — especially between actional and affectional intentions, for Thomas frequently treats these two practically oriented intentions as one⁶⁷.

⁶⁷ For the sake of clarity and parsimony I have sharply distinguished actional and affectional intentions from each other, when they are often distinct yet inseparable from each other (cf. ST, I-II.17.4). While Thomas never explicitly distinguishes these three kinds of intentions, I have shown that he clearly makes use of all three different types of intentions; however, in many contexts, where
This last point provides the key differentia needed to distinguish what makes cogitative and intellective perceptions moral. Even though cogitative and intellective perceptions of aspential and categorical intentions do not specify the appetites, their perception of actional-cum-affectional or operable-cum-axiological precepts do specify the concupiscible and irascible appetites and the will. But in order to be 'moral' in the proper sense, the actional-cum-affectional intentions of the cogitative power need to be endorsed by a judgment of practical reason; without the judgment of practical reason the affectional intentions of the cogitative power are only potentially moral.

To be a moral action is, for Thomas, to be an action that is judged by practical reason to be either really, or at least apparently, suitable or unsuitable to the overall well-being of the human subject. That is to say, moral actions are rational and voluntary human actions that are achieved by a free exercise of the will vis-à-vis some action that is rationally ordered to an end. Moral perception, then, consists in an act of incidental sensation (or, incidental imagination, if we use the term ‘perception’ in a loose sense) exercised by practical reason that rationally judges some object to be good or evil and so specifies the object of the will. And as has been shown, the two most prominent cognitive powers involved in such acts of moral perception are the cogitative power and intellect acting co-operatively as particular and universal reason, respectively.

Hence, the affectional intentions perceived by the cogitative power while functioning independently from practical reason are only potentially moral. But if the affectional intentions of the cogitative power are integrated into the axiological judgments of practical reason, then they become singular moral judgments of practical reason, and if such judgments of practical reason are also acts of incidental sensation, then they can aptly be called acts of moral perception.

This distinction between potential and actual cogitative acts of moral perception suggests another helpful analogy. Now just as Thomas distinguishes between passions that are antecedent and consequent to the judgments of practical reason, so analogously we can distinguish between perceptions of the cogitative power that are antecedent and consequent to the judgments of practical reason. This analogy calls for a few points of clarification. First, antecedent and consequent passions presuppose and are specified by the antecedent and consequent perceptions of the cogitative power, a point we shall discuss in the next section. Second, while consequent passions are causally posterior to the judgment of practical reason,

their differences are irrelevant, he treats them as one kind of intention. Finally, I should note that the distinction among the order of these three different intentions is formal, but on some occasions it is also temporal, see ST, I-II.8.3, esp. ad 3.

68 Cf. DV, 25.5; ST, I.48.1 ad 2; I-I1.8.1-2; 18.5; 19.1; 19.3; 24.1.
consequent cogitative judgments are, as we have established, actually integrated components of practical reason. Third, antecedent cogitative judgments and antecedent passions are both potentially consequent cogitative judgments and consequent passions. Finally, in the next section it will be shown that the consequent cogitative judgments of practical reason are in fact the proximate cause of consequent passions in the sensitive appetites.

Before moving on to the next section it will be helpful to tie together a number of loose strings by way of a brief synopsis. First, we have shown that Thomas assigns to the cogitative power the ability to be integrated into the operations of practical reason, and when this synchronization occurs, the singular actional-cum-affectional perceptions of the cogitative power are sublimated into the judgments of practical reason and become acts of moral perception. Again, whenever the cogitative power or intellect incidentally senses some object as suitable or unsuitable, particular or universal, end or means to an end, then such acts of practical reason are also acts of moral perception. Further, we also explicated Thomas’s account of the way in which prudence habituates the cogitative power to be subordinated to universal reason and thereby inclines both powers to virtuous operations of practical reasoning. Whenever the moral perception exercised by right practical reason flows from the habitual inclination of prudence, then we have a prudent moral perception. In short, for Thomas, insofar as prudence perfects acts of particular reason that estimate what is beneficial or detrimental with respect to certain incidental sensibles, prudence thereby also perfects acts of moral perception. Finally, we distinguished between antecedent and consequent acts of cogitative perception that are analogous to antecedent and consequent passions. And just as with antecedent passions, antecedent cogitative perceptions are only potentially moral, whereas consequent cogitative perceptions — which are integrated into the judgments of practical reason — actually qualify as acts of moral perception. Hence, it should be quite clear by now that the cogitative power plays a vital function in what I have described as Thomas’s doctrine of moral perception. In the next section we shall fill out this picture even more by contrasting the way antecedent and consequent passions are specified by the antecedent and consequent perceptions of the cogitative power.

II.4 Vis Cogitativa and the Specification of Antecedent and Consequent Passions

We noted above the confluence of the objects and operations of cognitive powers and appetitive powers. Thomas is clear that practical reason — which we have shown includes both particular reason and universal reason — specifies the will, but he is much more ambiguous about which sensory powers specify the sensitive appetites. Are the concupiscible and irascible appetites specified by the external sensorium, imagination, the cogitative power, or by all three? Thomas, in
fact, seems to suggest all of these possibilities and in various combinations. This is a controversial topic that cannot be addressed here. Elsewhere I have defended at length the interpretation that I shall briefly present here. I shall proceed expeditiously by way of three points: first, we must distinguish between somatic and psychic passions. Second, I will contend that the affectional intentions of the cogitative power specify the formal object of all psychic passions, while the external sensorium and imagination only specify the material object of psychic passions. Third, I shall show that the distinction between antecedent and consequent cogitative perceptions provides a very fruitful clarification of Thomas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions.

Thomas distinguishes between somatic passions (passiones corporeales) and psychic passions (passiones animales) and their intentional specification by external and internal apprehensions, respectively. In brief, somatic passions are equivalent to various kinds of bodily pleasure (delectatio) and pain (dolor), such as throbbing, burning, stinging feelings, aches, tickles, and the variety of pleasant and painful visceral affections. A somatic passion consists in a corporeal passion that is either suitable or unsuitable to the bodily organ and an external apprehension of this corporeal passion, principally by a sui generis form of tactility, which indirectly specifies the concupiscible passions of pleasure or pain. Because somatic passions cannot be directly controlled by reason, they are not relevant to our interests insofar as our focus is on moral perception and the passions of the sensitive appetite that can actually obey reason.

In contrast to somatic passions, psychic passions can become obedient to reason. As we have seen in a number of passages from Thomas, psychic passions, or what we might call emotions, are formally specified by the internal apprehensions of particular intentions by the cogitative power. To be specific, the affectional
intentions of the cogitative power evaluate that an action or reaction is suitable or unsuitable, easy or arduous to attain, and these affectional intentions affect a psychic passion in the concupiscible or irascible appetites. The difficulty with this interpretation is that Thomas seems to state — sometimes even within the exact same article — that the external sensorium and imagination can also move the sensitive appetites.

« The sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative [power] in other animals and the cogitative [power] in humans — which universal reason directs — but also by imagination and sense [powers]. Hence we experience the irascible and concupiscible [powers] to be resistant to reason, insofar as we sense or imagine something pleasurable that reason prohibits or something sorrowful that reason commands »

Are these two views compatible? I submit that Thomas’s various seemingly inconsistent statements can be reconciled insofar as we recognize his use of economical and metonymical expressions, as well as distinguish between the remote material object of the passions and the proximate formal object of the passions, a distinction Aquinas himself employs to clarify the way universal reason directs us to particular actions.

« According to the Philosopher in De anima book three, in us the intellect is not the only mover, but also phantasia, through which the universal conception of the intellect is applied to a particular operable. Hence the intellect is akin to a remote mover, but the particular reason and phantasia (ratio particularis et phantasia) are proximate movers »

First, notice that in this passage Thomas has no difficulty oscillating between the particular reason and phantasia, for, as was mentioned above, when imaginatio or phantasia is taken generically and synecdochically it includes the particular reason. Second, the particular reason proximately moves us to action — which includes moving the passions, but it also acts as a mediator for universal reason, which is a remote mover. In a similar way, I submit, sensation and imagination are remote movers of the sensitive appetite, and the cogitative power or particular reason is always a proximate mover.
According to Thomas’s own principles of faculty differentiation, the psychic passions of love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sorrow, hope, despair, audacity, fear, and anger are not specified and moved by mere per se sensibles or imaginables such as color, sound, odor, heat, moisture, shape, motion or magnitude; rather, the psychic passions of the sensitive appetites are specified by the suitable and unsuitable, the simple and the arduous, the lovable and the hateable, the terrifying or despairing, all of which are kinds of affecional intentions evaluated by the cogitative power with respect to its aspectual-cum-actional perception of an object. Hence, the formal or per se object of all psychic affections in the concupiscible and irascible appetites must be specified by the affecional intentions of the cogitative power. But if this interpretation is accurate, how can the senses and imagination provide even the material object of the passions?

Recall that per se sensibles and per se imaginables can both stimulate and provide the material object with respect to the formal object of cogitative and intellective acts of perception and thinking in the medium of images. And whenever the senses or imagination present the material object of the cogitative power, they prompt it to spontaneously perceive and think its own formal object and thereby estimate aspectual, actional, and affecional intentions. It is the latter cogitative affecional intentions — indirectly prompted by sensation or imagination — that provide the formal object of all psychic passions. Thus, the senses and imagination can indeed provide the remote material object of the psychic passions, but it is mediated by the affecional intentions of the cogitative power, which provide the proximate formal object that moves the sensitive appetites.

The foregoing account entails that the judgments of the cogitative power are open to two different and potentially conflicting influences: either its formal object can be prompted by the sensibles and images of sensation and imagination that serve as its material object, or its formal object can be integrated into the universal judgment of practical reason. In other words, the former kind of cogitative perception can be classified as a kind of antecedent cogitative perception — which is only potentially moral, whereas the latter judgment of particular reason can

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77 Cf. ST, I-II.17.7.
be identified as a kind of \textit{consequent cogitative moral perception}, because the particular reason’s perceptual operations are participating in the operations of practical reason. In the next section we will discuss the way habits in the cogitative power and sense appetites can incline the human person towards antecedent or consequent cogitative estimations of various particulars intentions, but we must now elucidate the way in which the antecedent and consequent affectional intentions of the cogitative power specify antecedent and consequent passions in the sensitive appetite.

It was argued above that the intentional specification of the passions of the concupiscible and irascible appetites are determined by their formal object, namely, the affectional intentions of the cognitive power. When the affectional intentions of the cogitative power are perceived independently from any synchronization with the judgments of practical reason, the result is an antecedent cogitative perception that specifies an antecedent passion. But whenever the operations of the cogitative power are subordinated to and coordinated with the judgments of practical reason, then the affectional intentions perceived by the cogitative power or particular reason specify a passion in the sensitive appetite that follows the judgment of reason and is a consequent passion.

Again, whenever Thomas treats the obedience of the passions to reason, by \textit{reason} he implicitly means practical reason, and by \textit{practical reason} he means the particular reason as obedient to universal reason, and by \textit{obedience of the passions to reason} he means the sensitive appetites obey and are moved proximately by the particular reason which mediates the directives of the universal reason, the remote mover of the sensitive appetites. And any passion that is obedient to the judgment of practical reason — \textit{qua} particular reason coordinated with universal reason — is aptly called a \textit{consequent passion}. This analogous account of antecedent and consequent cogitative perceptions that specify antecedent and consequent passions goes a long way towards amplifying the details of Thomas’s doctrine of the obedience of the passions to reason and his suggestive metaphor that reason exercises political, but not despotic control over the passions\textsuperscript{78}.

Given the aforementioned distinctions, we are now in a position to clarify further the way in which consequent passions can contribute to our intentions and deliberations prior to the judgment of choice. As was shown above, Thomas distinguishes two ways in which passions are consequent to the judgment of practical reason. First, there is the way of redundancy wherein the desires and aversions of the lower powers are so harmonized with and consequent to the pursuits of the higher powers that they are also attracted to the object deemed good or evil by practical reason and the will. It is in this way that the cogitative

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. \textit{ST}, I.81.3 ad 2 ; I-II.9.2 ad 3 ; 17.7 ; 56.4 ad 3 ; 58.2.
power and the sensitive appetites are said to have a natural aptitude to obey and participate in the operations of practical reason and will\(^\text{79}\).

Second, there is the way of choice, which concerns a more specific case of consequent passions than the way of redundancy, because it consists in more than the natural overflow of the pursuits of the higher powers into the lower. Consequent passions by way of choice require consciously choosing and commanding the sensitive appetites to be moved to passions of desire or aversion, joy or sorrow, hope or despair, or anger. The salient difference here, as I take it, is that consequent passions by way of redundancy simply result from the natural aptitude of the passions to follow practical reason, whereas by way of choice, our consequent passions are the result of the rational agent quite contentiously determining to provoke or stir up their emotions. This brings us to an important question. When Thomas states that practical reason can command the passions, which of these two ways of causing consequent passions does he have in mind?

I submit that consequent passions can result from the command of reason both by way of redundancy and by way of choice. This is because in either case reason’s command of the passions must consist in practical reason ordering a certain construal of the cogitative power’s affectional intentions, which as the formal object of the sensitive appetite immediately causes obedient passions to be attracted or unattracted to this object. In other words, when Thomas states that reason commands the sensitive appetite, this is a metonymical way of saying that practical reason — via the confluent operation of universal reason ordering particular reason — judges certain objects to be good or evil, suitable or unsuitable and so forms particular and universal intentions that cause consequent passions in the sensitive appetite\(^\text{80}\). And consequent passions by way of redundancy can contribute in a variety of ways to our moral reasoning insofar as they can follow any of the judgments of practical reason such as wishing, intending, deliberating, and deciding.

To understand the manner in which the command of reason can be involved in the way of redundancy we must observe Thomas’s subtle account of command. Thomas holds that just as practical reason commands itself to wish, intend, deliberate, decide, and execute\(^\text{81}\), so also when it commands itself to intend an end, practical reason simultaneously commands, by way of redundancy, both particular reason to form affectional intentions of an end and the consequent passions of the sensitive appetites to desire this end.

\(^{79}\) Cf. \textit{DV}, 25.2 ; \textit{DQVC}, I.12 and ad 16-18 ; ad 23 ; \textit{ST}, I-I.24.1-4 ; I-II.74.3 ad 1.

\(^{80}\) Cf. \textit{ST}, I-II.17.7 and ad 3.

\(^{81}\) Cf. \textit{ST}, I-II.17.4-7.
The intellect or reason cognizes universally the end to which it orders the act of the concupiscible and the act of the irascible [appetites] when it commands them. But it applies this universal cognition to singulars through the mediation of the cogitative power »82.

Consequent passions can also be more directly provoked by a determinate choice to love or desire a certain object. Now choice concerns the means to the end, but often the means chosen are in fact subordinate ends to other means that must still be determined by deliberation and decision83. Hence, even the consequent passions by way of choice can, in a certain indirect fashion, concern the end insofar as the means chosen and desired become a subordinate end intended by practical reason and will, and desired by consequent passions.

Finally, let us note that this conclusion alleviates Butera’s concern and further corroborates Jensen’s thesis that virtuous passions can contribute to the deliberation of practical reason. For the singular ends apprehended by the particular reason in subordination to universal reason can — both by way of redundancy and by way of choice — specify the passions of obedient concupiscible and irascible appetites. And the passions attracted to such intended ends can encourage the deliberative operations of practical reason to stay focused upon the end being pursued through the discursive consideration of various means to the end. Indeed, Thomas’s account of the moral virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude that perfect the intellectual and sensual appetites, seems to be especially oriented towards showing how the appetites contribute to our pursuit of the ends of human action, just as prudence is focused on the means of human action. In other words, Thomas’s doctrine of justice, temperance, and fortitude is meant to highlight the way our appetitive attraction to the end by the will and passions contributes to prudence’s perfection of practical reasoning about the means to some end84.

In the next and final section we shall consider the way in which habits in the cogitative power and sensitive appetites incline the rational animal towards either antecedent or consequent passions.

II.5 Vis Cogitativa and the Passions of Temperate and Continent Persons

The cumulative results of the doctrines established in the previous parts of this study have provided us with the resources needed to attend to one final difficulty that Butera identifies in Thomas’s doctrine of virtuous passions.

82 DV, 10.5 ad 4 (Leon. ed., p. 309.119-124).
83 Cf. ST, I-II.13.3; 12.2-4.
84 Cf. ST, I-II.58.5, esp., ad 1 and ad 3.
« [It] appears unable to account for an important difference between the temperate and the continent revealed by experience, namely, the near consistency with which the former experiences ordinate antecedent passions, and the failure of the latter to do the same. (I say “near” consistency because the temperate will sometimes experience mild, inordinate, antecedent passions, the \textit{fomes peccati}...) Whether or not affective spontaneity is characteristic of the morally virtuous life, we should expect the antecedent passions of the temperate person to be ordinate most of the time; it would be strange if it turned out that the temperate person experienced just as many mild, inordinate, antecedent passions as the continent. But what explains this difference? What accounts for the consistency with which the temperate person experiences properly ordered mild antecedent passions? »

In short, how does one differentiate between the ordinate antecedent passions of the temperate person and the inordinate antecedent passions of the continent person?

We must first distinguish the temperate from the continent person. The temperate person knows what is right to do, desires it as right, and does what is right, whereas the continent person knows what is right to do, desires what is wrong, and yet manages to do what is right despite their inordinate passions. In other words, the temperate person’s cognitive and appetitive powers are inclined to act in conformity with each other, whereas this is not the case in the continent person whose antecedent passions conflict with the judgment of right reason.

Now there are two ways to interpret Butera’s question and both are instructive. First, one might simply contend that the question itself is based upon a category mistake, for \textit{qua} temperate, the temperate person does not have antecedent passions, let alone ordinate ones. Indeed, for the temperate person antecedent perceptions and passions are both rare and irregular, and only occur when the temperate person fails to act temperately. Why? Perception is absolutely fundamental and ubiquitous to the everyday life of an animal, and moral perception is just as ubiquitous to rational animals. For a virtuous person to continue being virtuous, they must regularly exercise acts of virtuous moral perception by utilizing their virtues. This is why antecedent cogitative perceptions and passions are quite exceptional for the temperate person. Furthermore, for Thomas, if a person has one of the cardinal virtues, then they have all of them. Hence, to be temperate is also to possess the virtues of prudence, justice and fortitude. Now \textit{qua} temperate, the temperate person does not experience any antecedent passions, because the virtue of temperance has conditioned the concupiscible appetite to prevent them. But also \textit{qua} prudent, the same person must be prudent, and \textit{qua} prudent their cogitative power is disinclined towards antecedent perceptions because

\textit{Butera, On Reason’s Control of the Passions in Aquinas’s Theory of Temperance, p. 159.}
Aquinas on moral perception and the *vis cogitativa*

It is habitually disposed towards consequent perceptions that always or for the most part spontaneously participate in the judgment of practical reason, and such cogitative moral perceptions can only specify consequent passions. And just as there is no reason why the virtuous person must have antecedent cogitative perceptions prior to consequent cogitative moral perceptions, so also there is no reason why the virtuous person must first have antecedent passions that then become consequent passions. Hence, the question, « why does the temperate person experience more mild ordinate antecedent passions? » is imprecise, for by definition, temperate persons *qua* temperate do not experience antecedent passions at all.

There is, however, another way to phrase the question that avoids this category mistake and targets the difficulty Butera seems to have in mind. Butera recognizes that, for Thomas, the virtuous disposition for the temperate person to act temperately is but a habitual inclination that can fail in the particular. So, to be more precise, what we want to know is: what stimulates such exceptional acts of antecedent cogitative perceptions and passions for the temperate person? In other words, under what circumstances does the person with temperance have antecedent passions? By answering this question we will also elucidate what differentiates the antecedent passions of the temperate from the continent persons in those cases where the temperate person fails, at least initially, to act on the basis of their virtuous habits.

Most of the things in the world that we encounter through sensory-perception are beyond our control, but it is up to us to perceive things in one way or another and it is these perceptual estimations that activate our emotions. The virtues help facilitate our ability to negotiate through the vicissitudes of life by habitually inclining our powers towards the goods determined by right reason. Nevertheless, we are fallible finite agents, and Thomas recognizes that no human person can foresee every possible moral obstacle. Even the temperate person will fail to anticipate all the objects that fortune might force them to confront; virtuous habits cannot perfectly prepare the person to be vigilant in every instance. The material objects of cogitative perceptions presented by sensation or imagination can catch the cogitative power and practical reason off guard. For example, the extrinsic influence of sensible and imaginable stimulation can provoke the cogitative power to perceive or think spontaneously and independent of practical reason the meaning of a sound that, as an incidental sensible, is a hateful or sorrowful word, or to identify a random image, which happens to be pornographic. But, as Butera points out, even when such spontaneous influences disarm the temperate

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86 Cf. *DV*, 25.4 ad 5; *ST*, I-II.77.2; II-II.72.1 ad 1.
person and arouse antecedent cogitative perceptions and passions, they need not be *inordinate* or *vehement*. Why not?

The vehemence or mildness of the sensitive appetite’s attraction or aversion will be dependent on the fluctuations of the person’s physiology, psychological moods, and the condition of the sensitive appetites themselves. Sensitive appetites not conditioned by the virtue of temperance can easily give rise to inordinate passions that are vehemently attracted to the objects presented by the initial and spontaneous antecedent cogitative perceptions. But while this can occur to the continent person, the temperate person has the virtue of temperance that at least hinders the possibility of vehement antecedent passions resulting from antecedent cogitative perceptions. Hence, even when they have antecedent passions, the temperate person is not disposed to having vehement antecedent passions arise in their concupiscible appetite\(^\text{87}\).

The issue for Butera, however, concerns what makes the mild antecedent passions of the temperate person tend to be *ordinate*? Why are the mild antecedent passions of the temperate person who fails to act temperately more likely to be *ordinate* than those of a continent person? By an *ordinate* mild antecedent passion, I understand Butera to mean an antecedent passion that is non-virtuous, because it is prior to the judgment of reason, but once examined by practical reason should be endorsed by a judgment of right reason, which will then render it a consequent passion, and maybe a virtuous consequent passion. In order to avoid the erroneous conclusions of the theory of automatic virtuous passions, Butera correctly maintains that the sensitive appetites as such cannot account for why the antecedent passions of the temperate person might be ordinate in contrast to those of a continent person. This is because *ordinate* passions, like *virtuous* passions, require a cognitive specification that orders the passions, and this cannot be supplied by a sensitive appetite, hence Butera’s difficulty.

But this is not a difficulty for antecedent cogitative perceptions because they are cognitive acts. Conceding that there can be mild and *ordinate* antecedent passions does not necessarily commit one to some version of the theory of automatic virtuous passions. For this problem is completely sidestepped by acknowledging our distinction between antecedent and consequent cogitative perceptions that specify antecedent and consequent passions. In other words, what makes the mild antecedent passions of the temperate person *ordinate* can only be resolved by considering the cognitive power that supplies the sensitive appetite’s formal object antecedently to the judgments of practical reason, and as we have shown,

this belongs to an antecedent estimation by the cogitative power. Hence, the differences between the antecedent cogitative perceptions of the temperate and continent persons are explained by their different habits of cogitative perception. So what differentiates their perceptual habits?

Whether we perceive the world antecedently or consequently to the judgment of reason, a person cannot help deploying their perceptual habits for recognition. One perceptually identifies things in the world spontaneously, and all acts of apperception deploy the recognitional templates of past experiences to aid in their aspectual, actional, and affectional cogitative perceptions. Our perceptual recognitional repertoire is also conditioned and expanded by our patterns of rational thinking and linguistic communication. But the same material object (from sense or imagination) is open to various cogitative estimations, which can flow from distinct and even opposed habits. This is why the temperate person will be rationally habituated to moral perceptions that estimate pornographic images to be objectionable and misogynistic, whereas continent and incontinent persons might be more inclined to cogitatively perceive such images as erotic and titillating.

And as we have seen, when our perceptual habits are conditioned and ordered by right practical reason perfected by prudence, then the cogitative power is integrated into and participates in the virtue of prudence. Whenever the cogitative power acts independently of practical reason, it nevertheless can still operate on the basis of these ordinate habits. Hence, the antecedent cogitative perceptions that flow from these ordinate, though non-virtuous habits, can be ordinate antecedent perceptions that specify ordinate mild antecedent passions. It is the absence of such ordinate perceptual habits in the continent person that explains why their antecedent passions consistently differ from the antecedent passions of the temperate person.

Consider the differences between the cogitative perceptions of temperate, continent and incontinent persons. The temperate person’s cogitative power is habitually inclined to be obedient to practical reason, whereas the judgment of universal reason in continent and incontinent persons is often distracted by or subordinated to the initial evaluations of the cogitative power. When acting out of temperance, even a pornographic pop-up Internet advertisement does not phase the temperate person; their spontaneously rationally ordered cogitative moral perception is one of disgust and they immediately close the window. But the pornographic image might also take same temperate person by surprise, for

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88 Also noteworthy is the distinction between virtuous and non-virtuous consequent passions. Insofar as the person with the virtues of prudence and temperance fails to act on the basis of these virtuous habits it does not entail that the cogitative perceptions must be antecedent judgments, only that they need not be prudent judgments of right reason that flow from the virtue of prudence. Accordingly, such persons might form either ordinate (but not prudent) or inordinate consequent cogitative judgments, which would cause ordinate (but not temperate) or inordinate consequent passions.
even the temperate person can fail to act out of temperance. Nevertheless, their antecedent cogitative perceptions can still be ordinate, though not virtuous, because they are formed on the basis of ordinate cogitative perceptual habits. Such ordinate antecedent cogitative perceptions specify ordinate mild antecedent passions. If the temperate person were then to evaluate their reaction according to the order of right reason, their consequent perceptual judgments and passions would confirm that their antecedent perceptions and passions were ordinate and correct.

When the continent and incontinent persons have the same experience they might find the image to be an alluring surprise to which they, at least initially, ogle over. Given their similar antecedent perceptions and passions, what distinguishes the continent from the incontinent person is how they act after weighing the pros and cons of continuing their lewd behavior. The consequent perceptions and passions of the continent person will in the end follow a judgment of practical reason that determines such behavior is indecent and that they should close the pop-up window and return to their work. Unlike the temperate person, the continent person allowed practical reason to entertain an antecedent perception and passion contrary to right reason; only after deliberation did they make the consequent judgment that it should be avoided. In contrast, the consequent perceptions and passions of an incontinent person would follow a verdict of practical reason that condones such behavior as justifiable because it is pleasurable — after all, it is not like they were looking for pornography.

In short, it is the different perceptual habits in the cogitative power possessed by the temperate, continent, and incontinent persons that explains why the temperate person is inclined towards ordinate antecedent passions, while the latter two are not.

CONCLUSION

Let us conclude with a brief recapitulation of the questions addressed by this study. In the first part we rehearsed the salient points of Butera’s and Jensen’s interpretations of Thomas’s doctrine of virtuous passions. Jensen’s study was principally concerned with addressing what appeared to be one unsettling result of Butera’s interpretation of virtuous consequent passions in Thomas, namely, that it seemed to exclude consequent passions from virtuous deliberations. By elucidating the function of the vis cogitativa in Thomas’s account of practical reason and consequent passions, this study has amplified Jensen’s exegetical and philosophical defense of the view that, for Thomas, consequent passions can contribute to virtuous deliberations. This was accomplished in the first four sections of the second part.

In the first section of the second part we examined the place of the cogitative power within Thomas’s philosophical anthropology. The second section established
that Thomas’s notion of practical reason consists in the coordinated and unified acts of the cogitative power and the possible intellect, wherein the operations of the particular reason are instrumentally subordinated to the directives of universal reason. The third section elaborated on this point by showing that the perfection of practical reason by prudence not only rightly orders the universal intentions of the universal reason, but also enhances particular reason’s formation of particular intentions of the singular ends and means of human action. By drawing on Thomas’s doctrine of *per accidens* sensation we also defined *moral perception* as any act of incidental sensation exercised by practical reason. Accordingly, we defined *prudent moral perception* as any rightly ordered act of *per accidens* sensation by practical reason that flows from the habit of prudence. The distinctions defended in the third section paved the way for the fourth section’s elucidation of the way the affectional intentions of the cogitative power specify the formal object of the passions of the concupiscible and irascible appetites. In this section we also developed an analogous account of antecedent and consequent cogitative perceptions so as to provide a more robust explanation of how different cogitative apprehensions can specify either antecedent or consequent passions.

In the last section we addressed Butera’s worry that Thomas’s doctrine of temperance is incapable of explaining the difference between the antecedent passions of temperate and continent persons. To overcome this difficulty we drew on the previous sections of this study, and in particular our account of antecedent and consequent cogitative perceptions. It was shown that Thomas’s doctrine of the virtues does contain the resources needed to explain the differences between the antecedent passions of temperate and continent persons so long as we recognize that the salient differentiating factor is found in cognitive perceptual habits of the particular reason and not in the habits of sensitive appetites. The perceptual habits of the former can be so ordered by virtuous practical reason that they will continue to be inclined towards ordinate perceptions even when they are functioning independent of practical reason, whereas the perceptual habits of continent and incontinent persons are not so ordered, because their cogitative perceptions frequently vacillate between both ordinate and inordinate cogitative judgments. Finally, it was shown that even when the temperate person fails to act on the basis of virtue, their perceptual habits are still disposed towards *ordinate* antecedent cogitative perceptions that specify *ordinate* and mild antecedent passions.

This study has explored in detail the function of the *vis cogitativa* in Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. I hope that I have shown the reader how important the *vis cogitativa* and a robust account of cogitative moral perception are for understanding Thomas’s doctrines of practical reason, human action, the obedience of the passions to reason, and his distinction between antecedent and consequent passions.
This study examines the function of the *vis cogitativa* in Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. It builds upon recent scholarship concerning his understanding of the way virtuous passions can contribute to deliberation and practical reasoning, by explicating the way the cogitative power is integrated into acts of practical reason, is essential to all acts of moral perception, and specifies the passions of the sensitive appetites. In order to clarify a number of ambiguous features of Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions and the obedience of the passions to reason, this paper makes use of an analogous account of antecedent and consequent cogitative estimations that causally specify these different passions. It then compares the way prudence and other habits of practical reason enhance the acts of cogitative moral perceptions that specify the sensitive appetites in temperate, continent, and incontinent persons.

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