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(Editores)

PASIONES Y VIRTUDES  
EN LA ÉPOCA DEL GRECO

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# AQUINAS ON SENSITIVE APPETITIVE POWERS AND SUÁREZ'S REDUCTIONISM IN *DE ANIMA*

*Daniel Heider*

## 1. Introduction

It is notorious that the relationship of Francisco Suárez's philosophy to Thomas Aquinas's thought is neither unambiguously positive nor negative, but complex and differentiated<sup>1</sup>. Besides Aquinas and Thomism, other scholastic sources had significant impact on Suárez, in particular the Scotistic and nominalist traditions. In my paper, I would like to focus on what I consider to be an important feature of Suárez's methodology in general, which can be called "the reduction of Aquinas's real distinctions to weaker counterparts", especially to conceptual variety. In metaphysics, as is well-known, the most proverbial case is epitomized by the reduction of the real distinction between the essence and existence of finite beings to the conceptual distinction with a foundation *in re*. In cognitive psychology, one of the most famous examples is the "diminution" of the real distinction between the agent intellect and the potential intellect to the conceptual, or (perhaps) (Scotistic) formal distinction. The same approach can be observed in affective psychology, our main concern, as well. The most striking illustration is presented by Suárez's critique of Aquinas's doctrine of the real distinction between the concupiscible faculty [*epithumia*] and the irascible power [*thumos*].

I proceed in three steps. After preliminary remarks on the conceptual scheme shared by both authors, I present Aquinas's two crucial (ramified) arguments for the real distinction between the concupiscible power and the irascible (active) potency. They can be found not only in the *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 81, a. 2, but also (and more extensively) in the treatises *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 25, a. 2 and the *In III Sententiarum*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2. Third, I expound the Jesuit's objections to those arguments, supplemented by Suárez's own doctrine, which is presented in his *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristo-*

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<sup>1</sup> This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 14-37038G: "Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context".

*telis De anima*<sup>2</sup>. In conclusion, on the basis of structural analogy, I relate Suárez's reduction to another one concerned with the *distinctio formalis* of John Duns Scotus, which is employed by the Jesuit in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* no less frequently than the one connected with the "diminution" of Aquinas's real distinctions.

## 2. Shared presumptions

Not differently from cognitive psychology, the Aristotelian-scholastic affective psychology—at least, in its mainstream—discerns the following sequence of ontological items: "the soul (first act)—power (faculty)—habit—operations (acts)". Much like Aquinas, Suárez acknowledges only one soul, in the case of man the rational soul virtually containing the lower ones, namely the sensitive and vegetative soul<sup>3</sup>. In analogy to Aquinas, Suárez denies other substantial forms such as the form of corporeity [*forma corporeitatis*]. Both accept the two basic definitions of the soul from Aristotle's *De anima*, one defining the soul as first act of the organic body potentially having the life, the second as the intrinsic principle of its vital operations<sup>4</sup>. In opposition to nominalism, both are in accord that the powers emanating from the soul are really distinct both from the soul and among themselves, even though they employ different arguments for this conclusion<sup>5</sup>.

When speaking about the appetitive powers in general [*in communi*], they distinguish two groups of inclinations. One regards the natural appetite [*appetitus naturalis*], the other is related to the psychic or elicited (triggered) appetite

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<sup>2</sup> I quote from S. Castellote's critical edition found at the URL: [www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm](http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm). I shall cite in the following form: *De anima*, (disputation) *x*, (question) *y*, (number) *z*.

<sup>3</sup> For Aquinas see, among others, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 4, c. All works of Aquinas are quoted from editions found at the URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>; for Suárez see *De anima*, 2, 5, 4.

<sup>4</sup> "The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality of natural body potentially possessing life; and as such will be any body which possesses organs"; Aristotle, *On the Soul*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2000, 412a28-412b1. "The soul is the origin [*arché*] of the characteristics we have mentioned, and is defined by them, that is by the faculties of nutrition, sensation, thought and movement"; 413b11-12.

<sup>5</sup> See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 77, a. 1, c; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 3, 1, 7.

[*appetitus elicitus*]<sup>6</sup>. By virtue of the substantial form, each natural thing has its own natural inclination, e.g., heavy objects tend to fall down, light ones (e.g. fire) go up. The triggered appetite differs from the natural one in that it is stirred up by a previous cognition. Basically, it can be set off by two kinds of cognition, i.e., by the sensitive cognition, or by the intellectual apprehension. Accordingly, there are two kinds of appetites, the sensitive one and the intellectual one called the will [*voluntas*]<sup>7</sup>. The acts of the will are called volitions, and because they follow intellection and do not reside in an organ, they are free<sup>8</sup>. The universality of the object of the intellect also means the universality of the object of the will, which is the good in general [*bonum in communi*]. The *appetitus sensitivus*, acts of which are called *passiones* (due to the term's negative connotations we call them rather "emotions"), is much more restricted in scope<sup>9</sup>. Its object is the sensible good [*bonum sensibile*], i.e., the good cognizable by the sensitive powers. As such this appetite is connected with corporeal conditions and animals also have use of it. What is of significance for this study is that these emotions (volitions as well) are *objectual* states<sup>10</sup>. They have their own intentionality caused by the precedent cognition. Therefore, "the Heideggerian moods", i.e., boredom and anxiety, are not, properly speaking, emotions for Aquinas and Suárez. One may, with Peter King, concisely say that an emotion is for both "an objectual non-volitional affective psychological state"<sup>11</sup>.

### 3. Aquinas on the concupiscible and irascible powers

In the field of affective psychology, one of the most significant divergences between Suárez and Aquinas lies in the issue of the ontology of the sensitive appetitive powers. Basically, both admit the classical distinction between the

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<sup>6</sup> Regarding Aquinas see *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 80, a. 1, c. For Suárez see *De anima*, 10, 1, 2: "Praeter hunc appetitum naturalem est in qualibet re cognoscente specialis potentia animae per quam appetit proprio actu vitaliter".

<sup>7</sup> See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 80, a. 2; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 10, 1, 3.

<sup>8</sup> "In actu autem appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius organi"; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, a. 3, c.

<sup>9</sup> Concerning the negative connotation of "*passio*" see also F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 2, 1.

<sup>10</sup> See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 81, a. 1, c; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 10, 1, 3.

<sup>11</sup> See P. King, "Aquinas on the Emotions", en *The Oxford Handbook to Aquinas* (forthcoming), p. 2, which can be found at the URL: [http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Aquinas\\_on\\_the\\_Emotions.pdf](http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Aquinas_on_the_Emotions.pdf).

concupiscible and the irascible powers. In fact, Suárez takes Aquinas's taxonomy of emotions, presented in his "Treatise on the Passions"<sup>12</sup>, as the point of departure for his exposition. Based on the shared criteria –the nature of objects (good/evil) and their temporal, or absolute character<sup>13</sup>–, they discern six concupiscible emotions, ranked in three couples (love-hatred, desire-aversion, joy-sorrow) and five irascible emotions, structured in two couples (hope-despair, confidence-fear) with the single emotion of anger<sup>14</sup>.

As for many authors including Plato, Gregory of Nyssa, Galen and others, so for Aquinas, the two abovementioned kinds of sensory emotions are the acts of two *really* distinct powers<sup>15</sup>. Two arguments for this conclusion can be extracted from Aquinas's *corpus*. First, both powers have to be considered as really distinct powers because they differ in their formal objects [*objectum formale*]. As is well-known, the formal object or the aspect of the material object is, in the scholastic tradition, responsible for the differentiation of powers and habits (e.g. sciences). The formal object of the visual power is color, while the material object is a colored body. Aquinas, speaking only about the good (not of evil), makes clear that it holds that while the formal object of the concupiscible power is the agreeable sensible good [*bonum sensibile delectabile*], the formal object of the irascible faculty is the arduous sensible good [*bonum sensibile arduum*].

<sup>12</sup> See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, qq. 22-48.

<sup>13</sup> Emotions relate to an object which is cognized as in some sense good, or evil, with respect to the nature of the cognizing subject. The basic appetitive movement pertaining to an object which is sensibly cognized as absolutely [*simpliciter*] good is called love [*amor*]. The appetitive movement pertaining to an object perceived as evil is called hatred [*odium*]. If the cognized good is absent, we speak of desire [*desiderium*]. In the case of absent evil we experience the emotion of aversion [*abominium*]. Present good arouses joy in us [*gaudium*]. When the cognizing subject relates to a present evil, she experiences sorrow [*tristitia*].

<sup>14</sup> For an exposition of Aquinas's taxonomy of emotions presented in the "Treatise on Emotions" in *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, qq. 22-48 see F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 2. If the cognized good is accompanied by the aspect of difficulty, a special type of emotions arises. The power producing these emotions is called the irascible faculty. The irascible faculty has to do with defending the sensible good. If attaining a good is perceived as possible, then this (difficult) good gives rise to hope [*spes*]. If, however, attaining a good is perceived as impossible, despair [*desperation*] results. In the case of evil, if we perceive the elimination of an evil as possible, then we feel courage [*audacia*]. If that turns out to be impossible, we experience fear [*timor*]. While a present good gives rise to no irascible emotion (as such it only stimulates a concupiscible emotion), a present evil gives rise to anger [*ira*].

<sup>15</sup> "Respondeo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem"; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 81, a. 2, c. "Dicendum est quod appetitus sensualitatis has duas vires continet, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem quae sunt ad invicem diversae potentiae"; *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 2, c.

These two formal objects are essentially different<sup>16</sup>. This difference in the formal objects can be observed in the substantially different attitudes of the appropriate acts to their correspondent goods. When desiring the enjoyable sensible good, the subject of this *appetitus* acts passively. One lets oneself be attracted or “pulled” by the object, in analogy to a natural thing, e.g. fire that is by its form inclined to head upwards. When applying the irascible power, one is active because one clears the difficulties in the way of pursuing the enjoyable good. Likewise, fire, by its potency, can destroy the contrary obstacles standing in the way of its movement to the natural “place” upwards. For Aquinas, in fact, there is no other more convincing reasoning to argue for the real distinction than the diversity between *potentia* and *actus*. Rather symptomatically, Aquinas asserts that the same holds for the agent intellect and the potential intellect. Inasmuch as the agent intellect *omnia agat* and the potential intellect *omnia fiat*, they have to be really distinct powers<sup>17</sup>.

Second, Aquinas also argues for the real distinction between the two powers by appealing to the doctrine of the real distinction among single internal senses. Notoriously, Aquinas admits four internal senses: the common sense, the imagination, the memory and the evaluative power or, in humans, the cogitative power. Aquinas's classification is based on two main criteria. The first criterion concerns the distinction between the presence/absence of a cognized thing, or in other terms, between intuitive and abstractive cognition(s)<sup>18</sup>. Whilst the common sense and the evaluative power come to know their object *qua* present, they are intuitions, the memory and the imagination (phantasy) cognize it *qua*

<sup>16</sup> As Simo Knuuttila shows, this opinion was also widespread in the 13th century. See S. Knuuttila, “Emotion”, in R. Pasnau / Ch. van Dyke (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 428-440, esp. p. 434.

<sup>17</sup> “Ita in appetitu sensibili ista duo inveniuntur: nam animal per appetitivam potentiam appetit id quod est congruum et amicum sibi, et hoc per vim concupiscibilem, cuius proprium obiectum est delectabile secundum sensum; appetit etiam habere dominium et victoriam super ea quae sunt sibi contraria, et hoc per vim irascibilem; unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est aliquid arduum. Et sic patet quod irascibilis est alia potentia a concupiscibili. Nam aliam rationem appetibilitatis habet aliquid ex hoc quod est arduum, cum quandoque illud quod est arduum, a delectatione separet, et rebus circumstantibus immisceat; sicut cum animal relicta voluptate cui vacabat, aggreditur pugnam, nec retrahitur propter dolores quos sustinet. Et iterum una earum, scilicet concupiscibilis, videtur ordinata ad recipiendum: haec enim appetit ut ei suum delectabile coniungatur; altera vero, scilicet irascibilis, est ordinata ad agendum, quia per actionem aliquam superat id quod est contrarium vel nocivum, ponens se in quadam altitudine victoriae super ipsum. Hoc autem communiter in potentiis animae invenitur quod recipere et agere ad diversas potentias pertinent, sicut patet de intellectu agente et possibili”; Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 2, c.

<sup>18</sup> For the employment of those criteria in Aquinas see *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4, c.

absent, they are abstractive apprehensions. The second criterion is more important for us, though. It is based on the distinction between two kinds of sensible species [*species sensibilis*]. One of them is the sensed species [*species sensata*], the second is the non-sensed species [*species non sensata*]. The sensed one represents aspects of things in the way they are represented by the external senses. One can envision Peter by the phantasy because we have already seen him *in persona*. The non-sensed variety of species, in the classical example identified by Avicenna with the intention of danger perceived by a sheep<sup>19</sup>, is not detected by any of the external senses. The “invisible” intention remains hidden to the external senses. It is revealed by the evaluative or cogitative power. With eyesight the sheep perceives the wolf as a grayish spot of a certain size and figure. With the evaluative capacity it cognizes it under the intention of “peril”. It is this cognition that triggers in the sheep a certain emotion, namely fear, which is (in animals) necessarily followed by fleeing. Aquinas makes clear that apprehension by means of this *species non sensata* is more perfect than apprehension by means of the *species sensata*. He is sure that while an animal wishes for the agreeable good perceived by means of the sensed species, it is the non-sensed species of danger, not seen by the imagination, which sets off the acts of the irascible power. At the same time, the acts of the irascible power are more complex than the acts of the concupiscible power based on the simple “pull/push” scheme. The sensible arduous good is basically relational. In virtue of a medium a subject is referred to something else, which in itself is *delectabile*. As Aquinas repeats after Aristotle, animals fight (the act of the irascible power) for the sake of food and coitus (the enjoyable goods)<sup>20</sup>. The evaluative power is capable of distinguishing the intentions of what is difficult and what can be had as a result of overcoming an obstacle. Even though this collation of intentions of a means and an end pertains formally to the rational appetite, Aquinas is sure that it pertains also to the higher sensitive appetite, i.e., to the irascible power, common to both humans and animals. Accordingly, the irascible power, in the case of human beings, stands closer to the intellect than the concupiscible one. It participates in the higher faculty, namely in the intellect and in the will. The application of this device of *methexis* is important for Aquinas. As elsewhere, Aquinas’s applies the terminology of participation, taking it over especially from Dionysius the Areopagite, saying that the highest of the lower is connected with the lowest of the higher<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> See Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, S. van Riet (ed.), 2 vols., Peeters & Brill, Louvain / Leiden, 1968-1972, vol. 1, I, c. 5, pp. 86-87.

<sup>20</sup> See Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 2, c.

<sup>21</sup> “Tam ex parte apprehensivarum virium quam ex parte appetitivarum sensitivae partis, aliquid est quod competit sensibili animae secundum propriam naturam; aliquid vero, secundum quod habet aliquam participationem modicam rationis, attingens ad ultimum eius in sui supremo; sicut

#### 4. Suárez's critique

In the first question *Utrum in appetitu sensitivo sunt plures potentiae habentes obiecta diversa* of the disputation XI *De appetitu sensitivo* Suárez undertakes what Peter King calls a radical revision of Aquinas's theory<sup>22</sup>. In fact, there

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dicit Dionysius, in VII cap. *De divinis nominibus*, quod divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principii secundorum. Sicut vis imaginativa competit animae sensibili secundum propriam rationem, quia in ea reservantur formae per sensum acceptae; sed vis aestimativa, per quam animal apprehendit intentiones non acceptas per sensum, ut amicitiam vel inimicitiam, inest animae sensitivae secundum quod participat aliquid rationis: unde ratione huius aestimationis dicuntur animalia quamdam prudentiam habere, ut patet in principio *Metaphysica*, sicut quod ovis fugit lupum, cuius inimicitiam nunquam sensit. Et similiter ex parte sensitivae. Nam quod animal appetat id quod est delectabile secundum sensum, quod ad concupiscibilem pertinet, hoc est secundum propriam rationem sensibilis animae; sed quod relicto delectabili appetit victoriam, quam consequitur cum dolore, quod ad irascibilem pertinet, competit ei secundum quod attingit aliquantulum appetitum superiorem; unde irascibilis est propinquior rationi et voluntati quam concupiscibilis"; Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 2, c. "Tam in apprehensione quam in appetitu sensitivo invenitur aliquid in quo sensitivum rationem attingit. Quod enim animal imaginetur formas apprehensas per sensum, hoc est de natura sensitivae apprehensionis secundum se: sed quod apprehendat illas intentiones quae non cadunt sub sensu, sicut amicitiam, odium, et huiusmodi, hoc est sensitivae partis secundum quod attingit rationem. Unde pars illa in hominibus, in quibus est perfectior propter conjunctionem ad animam rationalem, dicitur ratio particularis, quia confert de intentionibus particularibus; in aliis autem animalibus, quia non confert, sed ex instinctu naturali habet huiusmodi intentiones apprehendere, non dicitur ratio, sed aestimatio. Similiter etiam ex parte appetitus, quod animal appetat ea quae sunt convenientia sensui, delectationem facientia, secundum naturam sensitivam est, et pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem; sed quod tendat in aliquod bonum quod non facit delectationem in sensu, sed magis natum est facere tristitiam ratione suae difficultatis, sicut quod animal appetat pugnam cum alio animali, vel aggredi aliam quamcumque difficultatem, hoc est in appetitu sensitivo secundum quod natura sensitiva attingit intellectivam; et hoc pertinet ad irascibilem. Et ideo sicut aestimatio est alia vis quam imaginatio, ita irascibilis est alia vis quam concupiscibilis. Objectum enim concupiscibilis est bonum quod natum est facere delectationem in sensu: irascibilis autem bonum quod difficultatem habet. Et quia quod est difficile, non est appetibile in quantum huiusmodi, sed vel in ordine ad aliud delectabile, vel ratione bonitatis quae difficultati admiscetur; conferre autem unum ad aliud, et discernere intentionem difficultatis et bonitatis in uno et eodem, est rationis: ideo proprie istud bonum appetere est rationalis appetitus: sed convenit sensitivae, secundum quod attingit per quamdam imperfectam participationem ad rationalem, non quidem conferendo vel discernendo, sed naturali instinctu movendo se in illud, sicut dictum est de aestimatione. Et per hoc patet etiam quod irascibilis est altior quam concupiscibilis, et propinquior rationi"; *In III Sententiarum*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>22</sup> P. King, "Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions. Controversies in the Thomist Tradition", in H. Lagerlund / M. Yrjönssuuri (eds.), *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht, 2002, pp. 229-258. In this paper King presents Suárez's theory of the passions in the context of the Thomist tradition (Cajetan, Bartolomé de Medina and

is only one adequate object of the *appetitus sensitivus* –the sensible good–common to both faculties. Suárez makes clear that *arduum*, designating for Aquinas the quasi-specific difference of the irascible capacity, cannot have the logical character of the specific difference. If it did, what would be the genus contracted by it? It cannot be the good in general, for that is the object of the will. The “specific difference” seems to determine a special kind of the good. The best candidate is the agreeable good, which is the sensible good *par excellence*. Consequently, the difficult agreeable good will become the formal object of the irascible faculty. Suárez is sure that it cannot be the case. If the irascible faculty can long for the arduous agreeable good, *a fortiori* can it desire the non-difficult good. There must be *realiter* one sensitive appetite, which aims at the agreeable good whether difficult or not<sup>23</sup>. Both desires are so intertwined that they cannot be attributed to different powers. The irascible power defends only what is desired and turns against the obstacles standing in the way of the pursuit of a desired good. The very concept [*ratio*] of defending the good is thus integral to the pursuit of a desired good. The irascible power tends to put aside the obstacles standing in the way of the pursuit of the agreeable good<sup>24</sup>. The goal or the object of the irascible power constitutes an essential part of the goal of the concupiscible faculty. They are functionally related.

The significance of the activity of irascibility and the passivity of concupiscibility, largely copying Aquinas’s general physical theory of movement, is weakened by Suárez’s “activist” claim that an act of the sensitive appetite arises *solely* by means of the activity of the appetitive power and never by the causal efficiency of an apprehended desirable object<sup>25</sup>. The operations of the appetitive power, as vital acts coming from their own intrinsic principle, i.e., from the

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John Poinsett, whereas the last criticized Suárez’s revision from an orthodox Thomist position). However, King does not consider Suárez’s reductionist methodology in the synchronic context of his philosophy.

<sup>23</sup> “Omne bonum delectabile sensui, sive magnum sive parvum, potest amari per concupiscibilem; et si irascibilis potest appetere bona delectabilia, quae ardua sunt, multo facilius poterit appetere bona, quae non sunt ardua; et sic unica erit potentia quae fertur in delectabile bonum, sive arduum sit sive non”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 1, 3.

<sup>24</sup> “Actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt adeo inter se connexi et ordinati ut non possint recte separari et diversis potentiis tribui; ergo melius tribuentur eidem [...]. Antecedens probatur, quia irascibilis versatur circa bona iam concupita [...] pugnae animalium sunt de rebus concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis; nihil ergo defendit irascibilis nisi concupita; ergo congruum et necessarium est ut eadem sit potentia concupiscens et defendens, nam si tota ratio defendendi est quia concupiscit, quomodo una potentia defendit quod alia concupiscit?”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 1, 2.

<sup>25</sup> “Hoc supposito, est conclusio: Sola potentia appetitiva absque efficientia appetibilis cogniti elicit actum suum”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 10, 3, 6.

soul, cannot be caused by an extrinsic object apprehended by the senses. Moreover, unlike the cognitive potencies, which are fully indeterminate and thus proceed to cognizable objects through assimilation, the appetite or the inclination [*pondus*] to its object is already in first act. Unlike the cognitive sensory operation, it does not require prior activity of the object<sup>26</sup>. The impulse coming from a sensed object cannot be considered as the true efficient causality but only as a metaphorical movement proposing an object to an appetitive power<sup>27</sup>.

Suárez's reductionism is most noticeable in his theory of the internal senses. Contrary to Aquinas, Suárez says that *in re* there is only one internal sense, which is to be identified with *phantasia*. This phantasy is in charge of all the functions usually ascribed to the different powers<sup>28</sup>. Suárez rejects the above-mentioned two criteria distinguishing the internal senses. The first one, distinguishing between the intuitive and the abstractive internal senses, cannot be valid because a faculty cognizing abstractly must have or could have first cognized the very same object intuitively<sup>29</sup>. The second one, based on the distinction of the sensed/non-sensed species, must be dismissed as well. The intention of the danger presented by the wolf can be apprehended by a sheep only by means of the very same species, namely through the sensed species received by the external senses and then by the phantasy. In a link to Scotus<sup>30</sup>, Suárez affirms that there is no need to posit the second, more abstract, species "responsible" for the sheep's fear and its resulting flight. The very same sensed species, apprehended by the internal sense and not by the external senses, can secure both. It can provide both the sheep's apprehension that the given object is a wolf and that it is necessary to escape. Besides, if the non-sensed species were really distinct, one would have to show that a situation in which the wolf is represented as dangerous and not as grayish and of a certain size and figure is

<sup>26</sup> "In eis maior indeterminatio, quia carent omni actuali principio per quod assimilantur. Appetitus vero non operatur illo modo, sed inclinando se in obiectum; et quia de se est inclinatio et pondus, saltem in actu primo, ideo non eget activitate obiecti"; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 10, 1, 11.

<sup>27</sup> "Et quando finem [Aquinas] vocat principium actionis, loquitur moraliter, non physice. Et eodem modo appetitus dicitur potentia passiva metaphorice, sicut motio finis metaphorica est"; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 10, 3, 11.

<sup>28</sup> "Sensus interior est una potentia realiter et formaliter, solum quod distinguitur ratione, secundum quod ad diversos actus comparatur, et inadaequatis conceptibus concipitur"; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 8, 1, 24.

<sup>29</sup> "Ergo potentia cognoscens in absentia obiecti potest cognoscere in praesentia; non ergo propter hos actus sunt multiplicandae potentiae"; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 8, 1, 17.

<sup>30</sup> On Scotus's critique of this opinion see D. Perler, "Why is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf? Medieval Debates on Animal Passions", in M. Pickavé / L. Shapiro (eds.), *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 32-52; esp. p. 38.

possible. That, however, borders on absurdity<sup>31</sup>. It may be concluded that as we are not forced to posit a number of really distinct internal senses, we are not to consider more really distinct sensitive appetitive powers.

I leave aside the Jesuit's denial of the opinion, later advocated by John Poincot<sup>32</sup>, claiming that the concupiscible power resides in the liver and the irascible in the heart (Suárez locates them both in the heart<sup>33</sup>), and focus on his argument concerning which of the two powers is more perfect. It has been shown that Aquinas does not doubt which is the correct answer. The irascible power must be more perfect than the concupiscible capacity because activity is nobler than passivity. The nobler internal sense, the estimative or cogitative power, must be more perfect because it participates in a higher faculty, namely the intellect. That is also why Aquinas calls the cogitative power the particular *reason* [*ratio particularis*]. Suárez is of a different opinion. He makes clear that deciding which power is nobler is only a matter of viewpoint. On the one hand, it seems that the irascible power is more perfect as its object is more perfect. On the other hand, the emotions of the concupiscible capacity are nobler because the emotions of the irascibility are directed to the concupiscible good. Thus, the concupiscible emotions, being the final causes of the irascible emotions, seem to be more perfect. Hope concerning the difficult and attainable good is fully in the service of the emotion of desire, being the future concupiscible good, or, ultimately, joy that is the present attained good<sup>34</sup>.

Albeit Suárez speaks of the concupiscible and irascible powers as of distinct powers, the upshot of the abovementioned arguments is clear. The possibility of this talk is guaranteed not by their real distinction but by their rational dis-

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<sup>31</sup> “Quidquid sit de distinctione specierum, potentia cognoscens rem sub ratione insensata, debet etiam cognoscere illam sub ratione sensata; ergo istae potentiae non distinguuntur. Et probro antecedens, nam potentia cognoscens lupum ut inimicum, non alia ratione id cognoscit nisi cognoscendo figuram et alia accidentia illius exteriora”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 8, 1, 19. “Mihi tamen probabilis videtur has species insensatas non esse distinctas a sensatis, sed quod per eandem speciem, quae repraesentat lupum, cognoscit illum ovis sub ratione inimici”; *De anima*, 6, 2, 15.

<sup>32</sup> Ioannes a Sancto Thoma, *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus*, “Naturalis Philosophiae”, Quarta Pars, IV, q. 12, a. 1, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim / Zürich / New York, 2008, p. 384: “has potentias distingui, tum quia requirunt distinctum organa & temperamenta, nam irascibilis requirit multum roboris, & vivaciores spiritus, ideoque residet in corde [...] at vero concupiscibilis petit molliorem dispositionem, & residet in hepate”.

<sup>33</sup> “Unde dicendum est hanc potentiam residere in corde”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 1, 7.

<sup>34</sup> “Si istae potentiae distinctae sunt, quaenam illarum est perfectior? Nam ex una parte videtur quod irascibilis, quia illi tribuitur obiectum altius et nobilius; aliunde tamen videtur minus perfecta, nam tota ordinatur ad bonum concupiscibilem, scilicet ad defensionem illius, unde passiones concupiscibiles nobiliores sunt, scilicet amor, desiderium, etc. Neutrum ergo potest dici convenienter”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 1, 2.

tion. As one and the same person can fulfill various functions or positions (employer, father, friend, teammate, etc.), so one and the same sensitive appetite can operate concupiscibly or irascibly. Both capacities have the sensible good as its formal object. Nevertheless, while the concupiscible power is related to this object as to a pursuable object, the irascible power is applied to it as to a defensible object. Accordingly, the irascible faculty is immediately concerned with the means of the end. The conceptual distinction of both thus stems from the different *modi* under which the sensible good is attained. Consequently, it may be said that this conceptual distinction has its own *fundamentum in re* determined by the presence or absence of the quality of difficulty in the sensible good<sup>35</sup>.

## 5. Conclusion

Suárez conceived his *De anima* as a “liberal” commentary on Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, while in fact it is rather a rational reconstruction of the Stagirate’s text<sup>36</sup>. However, in the Vivès edition from 1856, the text in its title is presented as related to the second part of the *Summa Theologiae* of Aquinas<sup>37</sup>. This context makes clear that for Suárez the Angelic Doctor’s theory is a background of uppermost relevance. In particular, Suárez employs his taxonomy of sensitive appetitive powers and emotions as a screen, upon which he projects his own revision of Aquinas’s teaching. Besides decisive emphasis on the active aspect of appetite, which generates vital acts as all the other capacities of the soul actually do, this revision is primarily based on the *reduction* of the real distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible to its conceptual counterpart grounded in our inadequate concepts. In fact, the application of this methodological device in the case of appetitive sensitive powers is far from isolated in Suárez’s philosophy. I have already mentioned the reduction of Aquinas’s real

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<sup>35</sup> “Saltem ratione distingui possunt [the concupiscible and irascible; D.H.] et de illis loquendum est ut de multis, ideo sic possunt illis assignari obiecta ut utraque versetur circa bonum sensibile, tamen concupiscibilis respicit illud tantum ut in se appetibile in ordine ad consecutionem illius, tamen irascibilis respicit illud ut defensabile. Unde irascibilis immediate versatur circa media quibus defendendum est tale bonum, sive formaliter cognoscat rationem mediorum, sive materialiter tantum”; F. Suárez, *De anima*, 11, 1, 7.

<sup>36</sup> For this assessment of the text: A. Simmons, “Jesuit Aristotelian Education: *De Anima* Commentaries”, en J. W. O’Malley, SJ / G. A. Bailey / S. J. Harris / T. F. Kennedy (eds.), *The Jesuits: Culture, Learning and the Arts, 1540-1773*, Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1999 (URL: <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~asimmons/pdfs/De%20Anima%20Commentaries.pdf>).

<sup>37</sup> *Doctoris Francisci Suarez partis secundae Summae theologiae tomus alter. Complectens tractatus secundum de opere sex dierum ac tertium de anima*, Ludovicum Vivès, Parisiis, 1856.

distinctions between the essence and existence, the four internal senses and the agent and potential intellect, in the latter case either to the conceptual or, perhaps, to the (Scotistic) formal distinction. While the *distinctio formalis* as a device of Suárez's philosophical procedure is, at the least in *De Anima*, not refused by Suárez, the Jesuit's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, in many metaphysical *topoi*, reduces this *ex natura rei* distinction to the conceptual distinction<sup>38</sup>. Taking into account both kinds of reductions, it can be safely concluded that one of the most apparent methodological features of Suárez's philosophy is related to his application of Ockham's razor.

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<sup>38</sup> As an example of those reductions it suffices to mention Suárez's theory of transcendentals, individuation and universals. See D. Heider, *Suárez a jeho metafyzika. Od pojmu jsoucna přes transcendentální jednotu k druhům transcendentální jednoty*, Filosofía, Praha, 2011, pp. 167-178; 191-209; 249-269; *Universals in Second Scholasticism. A comparative study with focus on the theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617), João Poinso O.P. (1589-1644) and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673) / Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676)*, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 54, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam / Philadelphia, 2014, pp. 23-86.